From LISTSERV@ncsuvm.cc.ncsu.edu Wed Jul 15 21:07:02 1992 Date: Wed, 15 Jul 1992 21:04:12 -0400 From: Revised List Processor (1.7c) Subject: File: "E-EUROPE FILE11" being sent to you To: David Bozak Received: from SUVM by UNIVSCVM (Mailer R2.08) with BSMTP id 8168; Tue, 14 Jul 92 23:21:34 EDT Received: from SUVM (BTRAVICA) by SUVM (Mailer R2.08) with BSMTP id 8377; Tue, 14 Jul 92 23:19:56 LCL Date: Tue, 14 Jul 92 23:17:25 LCL From: BTRAVICA@SUVM Subject: Paper To: r505040@univscvm Jim, I'sending you my paper on xUSSR. It'll be presented at this year's ASIS in Phily. If interested, you may store it on E-EUROPE server. Bob Computer Networking in the xUSSR: Technology, Uses and Social Effects by Bob Travica (C) 1992 (btravica@suvm) & Matthew Hogan (m91hogan@suvm) School of Information Studies Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY, USA Keywords: computer network, Soviet Union, electronic telecommunication, network technology, electronic mail, social effects ABSTRACT An exploratory study on the state-of-the-art of computer networks in the countries of the former Soviet Union was conducted. Data were collected mainly via computer networks. The main finding is that computer networking rapidly develops in the xUSSR. This paper presents findings of the study. Four main computer networks are described in terms of their technology and uses. Social effects of computer networks are analyzed on the case of the failed 1991 coup. Latent social effects of computer networks are discussed. I. INTRODUCTION In March of 1984, a network user from the Soviet Union announced via USENET that he had joined the network. This unprecedented event surprised the international networking community. The presence of a networker from behind the Iron Curtain was a first in the history of both the Soviet Union and the global networks. Many USENET users expressed interest in the Soviet user's action. What a surprise when the posting turned out to be an early April Fool's Day joke, the kind that traditionally rolled through USENET. In 1984, the USSR (hereafter xUSSR) was part of the information and communication space controlled by the communist regimes. National networking was the exclusive privilege of the Soviet government and a limited number of users from the scientific community. Soviet international computer network links were reserved for the countries of the communist 'brotherhood.' Seven years after the April Fool's joke, networking in the XUSSR shows a dramatically different picture. Networking in the xUSSR is rapidly expanding. It now includes new wide area networks, gateways to global networks, new categories of network users, and an increasing range of network services. Initially, technical (i.e., computer) and business interests were the protagonists of network development. Although the xUSSR is still in the early stage of social andpolitical networking, if its contribution to global networking is to be realized, the research community must be incorporated into the worldwide networks. This paper has four parts: Introduction; technical aspects of the xUSSR computer networks; network uses (services); and, the discussion on the social aspects of the networking in the xUSSR. Our discussion of networking is in terms of four major wide area networks, and their information and communication uses. 1. Research Questions and Theoretical Framework This paper is based on our exploratory research conducted in late 1991 and early 1992 on networking in the xUSSR. We are using a simple descriptive model of the implementation of a new technology into the social context. Consider the introduction and spread of the automobile as a new means of transportation. The questions the researcher might ask are: What do the cars look like; Who are the drivers; What are the cars used for; What new social phenomena are occurring and are likely to occur with the uses of cars. Similarly, we ask these questions about computer networking in the xUSSR: |What are the main networks and how are they designed? |Who are the people making up the networks? |What are the networks used for? |What are the actual and latent social effects associated with the networks? Our main research question is: |What is the overall trend of computer networking in the xUSSR? The main finding of our research is that computer networking in the xUSSR is increasing. This finding is based on answers to the four specific questions listed above. Answers to the above questions are: |There are four main wide area computer networks with growth potentials; |The user communities are growing and divergent; |The networks offer a variety of services; and |Some significant social impacts of the networks on the social context have occurred. We argue here that the development of networking can effect social changes in the political, economic, communication and scientific domains. Specifically, that networking can support democratic tendencies, the transition to a market economy, formation and support of telecommunication, computer and information industries, the spreading of computer-mediated interpersonal and mass communication, forging of invisible colleges among scientists, and breaking-up of the closed information system eveloped in the Soviet society. 2. Conceptual Issues In this paper, 'computer network' refers to two distinct but highly associated realities - technical and human. The former refers to computers connected via telecommunications links. The latter to webs of individuals voluntarily using interlinked computers to share ideas, exchange written texts, and gain access to online databases. The technical dimension belongs to the particular theory of networking that deals with special hardware, software, and mathematical graph theory. (1) The human dimension of networks borrows the sociological concept of group, but differs from it by implying freedom of participation, a noninstitutional nature, permanence of communication links, and duration determined by satisfaction of networkers' interests. (2) Our approach to computer networks is 'humanist.| (3) In other words, we recognize the necessity of the network technical dimension, yet concentrate on the social/behavioral dimension. The relationship between the technical and human dimension of a computer network is that the former is a necessary condition for the latter. A computer network differs from other forms of human networks that rely on media (telephone, fax, letter) or face-to-face communication. In an "invisible college," the technical dimension is not a sufficient condition for people to "get connected." Being a computer network user, even a frequent one, does not de facto lead to membership in a social group. One can just as easily remain intellectually and socially isolated in computer network space. The shift from isolation, to group member- ship, and finally to participation occurs, as mentioned above, when the permanence of communication among network users comes into play, together with mutual feeding of their interests. Studies on computerized conferencing provide evidence on these structuring effects. (4) A 'computer network' as used here designates the unity of the technical and human contexts discussed above. 'Computer networking' is the forming of uman webs by communicating via interlinked computers. The 'networker' is an active participant in at least one computer network. In contrast, 'network user' is one who just uses the technical infrastructure of a network, but is not involved in social networking. To simplify the language used in this paper, 'network' will be used for 'computer network.' Exploring networking in a macrosocietal context poses some challenges in terms of the theoretical framework. We found no satisfactory existing theory. We thus borrowed ideas from various information and communication theories. On the information side, our selection includes the technical theory of networking, the database and information retrieval perspective, the focus on information access and information transfer uses of networks, the value-added process, and a model of the Soviet information system. On the communication theory side, we combine ideas >from organizational-, computer mediated-, and mass communication. 3. Data Collection This paper is networking-generated. Computer networks were the primary source of data. We monitored international distribution lists and news-based networks devoted to networking and other develop-ments in the xUSSR. We reviewed electronic archives associated with these services. In addition, we spent dozens of hours on-line communicating with key networking people in the xUSSR. We use on-line communication to gather new information and to check what had been collected. Therefore, our data collection method comprised three techniques: archival searching; interviewing; and, surveying. Each of these was done via computer networking. We also reviewed selected texts on the social and cultural contexts of the xUSSR. II. TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF COMPUTER NETWORKS In this section we describe four major wide area networks in the xUSSR: IASNET; RELCOM; GlasNet; and SUEARN. Each network is described in terms of its objectives, geographical range and user distribution, design, architecture, host hardware and software, communication links, interconnections, and financial arrangements. The networking environment in the xUSSR is comprised of wide area networks, multiple local area networks, and numerous bulletin board systems. The complexity of the Soviet networking environment is rapidly increasing. The networks are spreading over a wide geographic area. This expansion imposes limitations in presenting up-to-date technical or political inform-ation. Some of what we present here is already historical. Our intention is to take a snap-shot of the early phase of net-working in a country that will soon grow out its 'infantile' stage. Having this record of 'childhood' may contribute to our under-standing of political, social and technical network relations. Wide area networks (WANs) conventionally re found in large cities, usually administrative and economic centers. In the xUSSR, Moscow is the hub and at the forefront of networking developments. Two out of the four networks explored in this paper are primarily Moscow-based. However, these two networks are expanding to remote locations. An example is Krasnodar the city at the heart of the region that Gorbachev selected for experimentation with market principles and implementation of modern technology. Local area networks (LANs) are mostly found in towns. LANs conventionally spread over an area of up to 32 miles (50 km) in diameter. Examples in the xUSSR include those linking schools and hospitals. LANs in the xUSSR constitute a separate topic in need of research. We will not discuss them further in this paper. There are numerous bulletin boards systems (BBSs) in the xUSSR. Users must cope with noisy voice telephone lines, and the lack of powerful servers (e.g., the RISC technology super microcomputers on the COCOM list of prohibited exports to the xUSSR). An important use of BBSs is PC software exchange. It is striking that the BBSs are mushrooming in spite of bad telephone lines. Almost every xUSSR-related discussion group on BITNET and USENET posts lists of BBSs on a regular basis. We will not discuss the BBSs further in this paper. 1. IASNET IASNET stands for 'Institute for Automated Systems Network.| It was the first public switched data network in the USSR, installed some-time after 1982 by the Institute for Automated Systems (IAS) whose name in Russian is VNIIPAS - Vsesoyuzniy Nauchno - Issledovatelskiy Institut Prikladnih Avtomatizovannih Sistem. IAS was established under the auspices of the national Academy of Science. The Institute is the National Center for Automatic Data Exchange (NCADE). The main IASNET host is in Moscow on the IAS premises. Initially, IASNET was de facto and de jure a star-like internetwork with IAS at the hub. Quarterman (1990) reported briefly on two of the most important IASNET networks - AkademNet and ADONIS. The former linked academic organizations and the latter computer centers to IAS. In addition, IAS was the hub of the international network linking the former Council of Mutual Economic Assistance's (CMEA) countries to the USSR. At first, IASNET provided access to scientific databases. With the political changes in the xUSSR and the break up of CMEA, the IASNET design is changing its star-like configuration. Romanov (1992) points out that AkademNet is still under development, constrained by a diverse set of problems --particularly political ones. In 1987, IAS obtained the status of Recognized Private Operating Agency, which meant a partial loss of the budget. Since then, IAS has been more entrepreneurial in its networking undertakings. For example, it is involved in two telecommunication joint ventures supported, in part, by foreign capital: The Soviet-American SovAm Teleport; and Soviet-Finish INFOCOM. The main objective of IASNET is to provide a wide range of network services to the scientific community in the xUSSR. It is a mix of network architectures. Its core is OSI-based, resting on the following suites of protocols: X.3, X.25/X.75, X.28 and X.400. (5) Being on these protocols allows IASNET to connect with European PTT data networks, which rely on these open standard protocols. In contrast, ADONIS rests on NJE protocols. (6) The IASNET main host was a Soviet-made Zilog 80 running the Unix operating system and in-house communication software. (7) In the Spring of 1991, a new host was setup -- Alcatels's DPS-2500. (8) IASNET uses both dial-up and leased lines. The speed of transmission via the former carrier was 2400 baud per second with Kermit support. Today, the leased lines transmit data at 9600 baud/sec. (9) IASNET national and international links are implemented via X.25 and X.75 lines. The former is used between Moscow and Novosibirsk, Odessa, Yerevan, Tbilisi, Rostov-On-Don, Dubna, Samara, St. Petersburg, Kiev and other nodes within xUSSR. Before the CMEA abolishment the X.25 lines reached the main research institutions in Poland, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Cuba, Mongolia, and North Korea. The only link remaining is to Cuba (the satellite channel), the other lines have been dismantled. A X.25 satellite link to the U.S. exists. Plans are underway to switch it to X.75. (10) IAS connects public data networks in Austria, Finland and Bulgaria -- Radio Austria, Datapak and Bulpak respectively -- by X.75 lines. Finally, IASNET has gateways to other domestic networks, such as RELCOM and Sovpak (a Marine Ministry network launched in 1991). 2. RELCOM RELCOM stands for 'Russian Electronic Communications.' Established in Spring of 1990, by the cooperative DEMOS and Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy (KIAE). The main host facilities are at the premises of DEMOS and KIAE in Moscow. The primary objective of RELCOM is to provide a wide range of users with e-mail, other network services, as well as a gateway to Internet. In the beginning of 1992, RELCOM had regional nodes in 25 cities if the xUSSR connecting over 1,000 organizations or 30,000 users. These nodes included the following types of organizations: small private businesses, joint ventures, securities and brokerage firms, various other private ventures, banks, large firms with public property, scientific and educational organizations (about 200), health institutions, domestic and foreign news agencies, some government institu-tions, and computer and informatics focused organizations and clubs. There are also a number of national and foreign individual users. Most RELCOM user groups are from the private economy sector. (11) The RELCOM main host is the de facto backbone of RELCOM. (12) Comprised of five VAXes and two twinhead-600 486 microcomputers, the equipment is linked by two Ethernets and a SLIP link. The backbone is located at the DEMOS and KIAE premises. RELCOM architecture rests on the UUCP protocol. This protocol links computers running some version of the Unix operating system, and predominately used with dial-up lines and for batch transfers. RELCOM uses the XENIX version of Unix, and dial-up lines. RELCOM has a gateway to IASNET. Its UUCP architecture allows RELCOM to connect with EUnet, one of the largest European Unix-protocol networks. The dial-up UUCP link is in Finland. RELCOM was assigned the ".su" Internet DNS in September of 1991. The .su DNS made possible access to Internet through the EUnet-Internet interbackbone link. This step linked Russia to Internet, the largest world's internetwork. Financially, RELCOM is on its own. The network was established with no government support. It continues to support commercial economic principles. 3. GlasNet GlasNet stands for 'Glasnost Network,' and thus bears the stamp of the glasnost and peristroika era. It is a joint venture of the Institute of Global Communications (IGC), San Francisco, and the International Foundation, which has offices in Moscow, Washington D.C., Stockholm, Sweden, Sofia, and Bulgaria. GlasNet is a member of the Association for Progressive Communications (APC). It began operating on May 30, 1991. The network headquarters is in Moscow. The main objective of GlasNet is to offer easy and inexpensive communication to diverse user groups. GlasNetintends to support non-profit and non-government organizations. (13) GlasNet covers Moscow and some remote users. Plans for expansion are underway (see the information below). The types of users linked by GlasNet include scientists, educators, cultural groups, journalists, environmentalists, and computer enthusiasts. The network's IGC/APC background is determined by the GlasNet architecture. GlasNet is a UUCP dial-up network implementing the MNP protocol. The main host is a 386 computer running a Unix operating system. GlasNet rests on Unix communications software, and APC e-mail and computer conferencing software. Communication links use voice lines for domestic traffic. The 1200 and 2400 baud modems are used for establishing terminal-network connections. The Moscow and other APC hosts link via international direct dial lines and Telebit modems. There are many GlasNet interconnections owing to the IGC/APC involvement in global networking. There is some concern in the international user community about GlasNet's interconnections. For instance, some SUEARN users have associated SFMT (San Francisco- Moscow Teleport) and SovAm Teleport to GlasNet. However, Caulkins (1992) reports that no institutional or business relationships exist between GlasNet and these telecommunication institutions. GlasNet is non- profit. It started with grant funding from several U.S. charitable foundations. User fees cover operational costs of the network. All charges are in rubles. 4. SUEARN SUEARN is the last wide area network we explored. Two acronyms make up the network name -- SU for Soviet Union, and EARN for European Academic and Research Network. SUEARN is a part of the European research network with links to the Middle East and Africa. The network is based at the Institute of Organic Chemistry (the acronym in use is IOH after the institute name in Russian). IOH operates under the auspices of the Russian Academy of Science. The implementation of SUEARN began in 1990. On October 21 of 1991, IOH opened the SUEARN international link. The main host is located at IOH in Moscow. The primary objective of SUEARN is promotion of information exchange between academic and research institutions. (14) So far 117 research and educational institutions and scientific associations have joined the SUEARN project. (15) Given that SUEARN is part of EARN/BITNET, the two must use compatible network architecture. In early 1992, the SUEARN network architecture rested on NJE protocols. However, the SUEARN designers intend to use NJE over IP. The network backbone will be supported by 68 institutions in the former Soviet republics, except Estonia, Georgia, and Moldova. In early 1992, SUEARN linked the Moscow environments, as well as individuals throughout the xUSSR. (16) Within the xUSSR, SUEARN provides a gateway network called FREEnet (the acronym stands for Research Engineering and Education). This is a TCP/IP network linking social and humanities research and educational institutions to the SUEARN backbone. (17) All FREEnet resources are free and any non-profit organization may join. The SUEARN budget comes from mixed domestic and foreign sources. The main host is an IBM 370 compatible computer ES1066 manufactured in a Minsk computer plant. The system software is MVS. Communication software has been designed in-house. SUEARN leases its intersite lines. Speed of data transfer via international lines 9600 bps. It is noteworthy that the youngest WAN has significant support from the U.S. networkers. Months before the SUEARN gateway opened, networkers gathered around BITNET's SUEARN listserv were discussing various issues related to setting up SUEARN in the xUSSR. This activity illustrates the intense interest of the international community in integrating the xUSSR into the global information and communication flows. In summary, IASNET, RELCOM, GlasNet and SUEARN are main networks in the xUSSR. They vary in terms of objectives, geographical and demographic spread, architectures, and financing. All the networks have growth potential. III. NETWORK USES In this section we discuss information transfer and communication in terms of the four networks described above. What do we mean by "networking uses?| Computer networks have several basic functions. One is to get and send "inform-ation." This is accomplished in two ways: by providing a medium for communication between individuals; and by enabling access to databases and electronic archives. By information transfer we mean distribution lists, file transfer, news-type software systems, electronic journals, access to bulletin boards, and so on. Communication uses are electronic mail (e-mail) and computerized conferencing. This classific-ation scheme parallels communication software types. From a system designers' perspective. >From a social/behavioral perspective, the above classification of software uses rarely meet that of the user's information needs. For example, a system based on distribution lists, such as BITNET, may well serve as a conferencing system, if 'conference' is a discussion characterized by unity of topic, discourse development, moderating roles, and some resume of the activity. A listserv providing such functionality, in discrete time limits, serves as a conference. This is so regardless of the retrieval capabilities, which may not rest on a hierarchical organization of postings -- the defining characteristic of conferencing software in eyes of system designers. In contrast, news-type systems, such as USENET, have interfaces with powerful retrieval capabilities. Yet this function-ality is not a sufficient condition to make some of the USENET newsgroups more than one-stop, in-out information shops. An e-mail system may well serve information access purposes, when a human being is the source of information. The ambiguities above suggest the need to blend technological and social perspectives when investigating "network uses." We view the use of technology as dependent on human needs and actions. This approach generally reflects how computer networks are used. Such a perspective may help us understand a computer network-scarce space like xUSSR, where users exploit software for their own purposes regardless of the system designer's stated intentions. 1. Network Services The first two services offered by IASNET were access to on-line databases and e-mail. The latter was offered on such a limited basis that it was almost unknown to IASNET users. (18) Today, IASNET offers worldwide database access, two e-mail systems (regular and Mini-Mail), a computerized conferencing system (on ADONIS), electronic data interchange based on the EDIFACT standard, currency conversion system, telecommu-nication and information management consulting, and various information services, such as a CUADRA-type catalog of foreign databases, PTT tariffs and codes, and more. (19) RELCOM RELCOM services include e-mail, USENET news and the access to USENET archives. In addition, computer conferencing services are being developed. Several news agencies, such as Interfax, Post factum and Moscow News use RELCOM to deliver information to their customers. (20) In its early stage of its development, RELCOM is both a traditional communication system (point-to-point), and a broadcasting medium. The latter confirmed during the 1991 coup d'etat discussed below. The first phase of the RELCOM implementation intended to be a full network integration into Internet. The provision of the Internet DNS (.su) was the initial step in this process. GlasNet GlasNet offers e-mail, computer conferencing, a selection of USENET newsgroups, and send-only fax. (21) E-mail is emphasized. Two characteristics of their e-mail worth noting are specific usage, and geographical reach of the system. In GlasNet, e-mail is used in conjunction with other communication media. There is a system called GlasMail for this purpose. It accepts e-mail or written letters from the United States, then transfers them as e-mail to Moscow, and finally routs the message by the most convenient form for the addressee, be it telephone, telegram, fax or letter. This is a situation appropriate response for the selling of the e-mail concept to potential user base, rather than to mature e-mail user community. The GlasNet users have access to many international and national networks. They may send mail to AlterNex, Applelink, ARPANET, AT&T LandMail, AT&T Mail, BITNET, BOLNET, CARINET, CGNET, CIGnet, COMLINK, COMPUSERVE, CONNECT, CSnet, DASNET, DELPHI, DIALCOM, EasyLink, EcoNet, ECUANEX, EIES, ENVOY 100, FIDONET, GALAXY, GeoNet, GreentNet, GTE, HandsNet, HURACAN, IMC, INET, Internet, JANET, MCI MAIL, MicroLink, NASA, PsychNet, ScienceNet, SOURCE, TCN, Telecom Gold, Telemeil, THE META-NETWORK, TWICS, Tymnet/Ontyme, UNDP, UNDRO, UNINET, UNISON, UUCPMail Net, USENET, Web, WELL, WORKNET, and OMNET. According to Caulkins (1992), GlasNet is planning new information services, such as computerized conferencing, access to databases maintained on IGC/APC hosts, and telex. GlasNet is also planning to expand service to new geographic areas. It may locate new hosts in St. Petersburg, Kiev and Dnetropetrovsk. SUEARN The main service provided by SUEARN in the first phase of its implementation is e-mail. This has been impeded by the high costs of intercity leased lines, and the absence of high quality modems.(22) The focus is on the Vladivostok - Irkutsk - Novosibirsk - Sverdlovsk - Moscow lines, and the lines from main nodes in Moscow to the former republics. Further implement-ation of SUEARN should allow its users to have the same services available on EARN / BITNET. The development of FREENet is constrained by the lack of hard currency needed for purchasing high performance hardware. 2. Databases and Online Services An ever increasing number of value-added information services and products are available in the xUSSR. These are primarily on-line public access catalogs (OPACS) and research databases (bibliographic and numeric). Until recently, scientific and academic institutions were the major database producers in xUSSR. The first on- line databases were installed by the Institute of Scientific Information on Social Sciences (INION) in 1980. More recently, other types of value added services are available such as, information brokering, current awareness publications, teleconferencing, and e-mail. The improvements in network communications combined with improved access to information technology has increased the Russian user-base for on-line services which now include scientists, academics and researchers. There is also a small, but active group of independent citizens interested in on-line services. This last group may be the BBS users, which we hope to learn more about them in the future. The factors limiting the development of on-line databases in the xUSSR parallel those facing their telecommunication industry in general. They are: the information infrastructure; economic realities; and ideological constraints. We discussed the information infrastructure in the previous section. The most telling economic issue in this context is the disparity between personal income and the cost of using on-line services. At this time, it is more cost effective to conduct a manual search, then an on-line information service. (23) Ideological constraints are easing. The opportunities for foreign enterprise are improving. Peristroika and glasnost have eased some constraints on free speech and privacy, but the paranoia of the Cold War years has yet to disappear. Notable exceptions to the isolation of the Soviet society are the joint ventures like SFMT, SovAm and GlasNet. Even with the opening of the xUSSR to international networking community, the restricted flow of information both into and out of xUSSR continues. There are three major database producers in the xUSSR. They are the Institute for Scientific and Technical Information (VINITI), the USSR National Public Library for Science and Technology (GPNTB), and the Institute of Scientific Information on Social Sciences (INION). Other database producers include government agencies and smaller academic institutions. The data-bases mounted by the three agencies are intended for Russian users. All are in the Russian language. Mayorov and Polyakov estimated that in 1990, nearly 1500 in-house databases existed. Their subject coverage is narrow, focusing on local research. The databases are both numeric and bibliographic. While most on-line databases are available only to their producers via inhouse networks (LANS), the increasing demand for information is changing this situation. In 1982, IAS sought to integrate the computer networks of the USSR Academy of Sciences and the "republican" Academy of Sciences. This was realized by IASNET with a gateway to AkademNet, the major value added service linking the majority of Soviet on-line services. IASNET provides access to on-line databanks, VINITI databases index and abstracts of Soviet and foreign scientific and technical literature. By 1990, there were over fifty databases, covering from one to eight years of various scientific literatures. There are a reported 5.4 million documents in the VINITI databank, with 1.3 million annual additions. IASNET also provides access to foreign and domestic on-line data-bases, and provides links with the Internet, GlasNet, EARN, and TELENET. In 1990, access to international on-line services was further expanded by the joint Soviet- American venture between SFMT and IAS called "SovAm Teleport." This joint venture suppots the INTELSAT satellite which links users in non- xUSSR countries with Russian databases. Accord-ing to Mayorov and Polyakov, IAS plans to mount databases and become an on-line service itself as the result of a joint Soviet French venture. The GPNTB is the largest library of its kind in the xUSSR. It has cataloged foreign monographs and periodicals, serial publications and computer programs from all the CMEA countries. Remote access to these databases is limited. In contrast, INION serves the scholarly community in xUSSR. The first databases were mounted in 1980. By mid-1990, the system supported fourteen bibliographic databases reflecting the subjects and geographic regions of its members. It also produces numeric databases and directories. The contents of these databases are Soviet and foreign monographs, journal articles, dissertations, working papers, and so forth. Coverage is from two to eleven years. The total volume was of mid-1990 was one million, with about 200,000 annual additions. All the databases are in Russian. On-line vendors of commercial databases are scarce in xUSSR. This situation is changing. In 1990, the International Centre for Scientific and Technical Information (ICSTI) was perhaps the only commercial-like on-line service in xUSSR serving the CMEA countries. (24) ICSTI intends to eventually automate data exchange between the CMEA countries. The databases at ICSTI were created by CMEA countries including the xUSSR. These reference resources (e.g., VINITI data-bases), industry directories, trade and economic databases, databases related to specific industries, and interdisciplinary research such as environmental protection. As xUSSR computer networks acquire more nodes, greater number of inhouse databases are being opened to remote users. Now that CMEA has dissolved and a new political landscape emerged, we will have to wait and see what comes of this ambitious project. (25) What will happen regarding the use of on-line databases in the xUSSR? Within the xUSSR, on-line information will continue to be found in distributed databases provided by public and "private" sources. The need for research information will lead to a dramatic increase in the use of established on-line services based in Western Europe, England, and the United States. With the expansion of the international research community in include xUSSR, greater demands on system operators and software designers will follow. This demand will bring with it issues specific to the xUSSR. Three of the most pressing are the pricing of services, and use of the cyrillic alphabet, and serving a foreign user community. The pricing issues are: systems that are not set for hard currency; the cost of searching and retrieving information that is often greater then the value-added by the system; and, the cost of technology severely constrains the user base. The problems associated with the use of cyrillic seriously hampers foreign access to Russian language databases. The cyrillic alphabet also constrains the exchange of information. It is difficult to integrate information from non-cyrillic with existing cyrillic texts. (Some progress is being made in this area) Finally, the xUSSR information profession has little, if any, experience serving a foreign user community. The only foreign users, with one or two exceptions, have been members of the CMEA countries. Soviet generated database designed for foreign use is the Soviet Press Digest, produced by Dialog in a Soviet-American joint venture. It is mounted on Mead Data Central as an information service. Another database is offered by TASS, the Soviet news agency. It is available full-text on Datasolve's World Reporter service.(26) What do we know about the on-line user community in the xUSSR? Like their counterparts elsewhere, little information is available on users beyond general demographics, gross categories defined by system operators, and the number of passwords formally assigned. Basede on our sources, we know that the types of users include managers, scientists and researchers, and information professionals. Given the limited number of passwords issued it is reasonable to say that there are very few users (or a lot of sharing of account passwords). Mayorov and Polyakov write that there are 145 on-line (remote) users of the INION database and 32 foreign users. We think that the user community will continue to grow, if or when, the information infrastructure and the economic situation improve, and as the ideological constraints loosen. A sign of change is noted: IAS has begun to sponsor educational sessions, demonstrations and general information about on-line services to its actual and potential users. Network users who are not affiliated with research or academic institutions can be divided into two basic groups: private individuals and business users. Individual networkers use the BBSs. Many are able to link to international networks. The amount of interest this group has in the on-line services is not clear. Access to numeric databases, bibliographic databases, and research resources may be of less interest then information services like news bureaus, and USENET services. Independent user groups are increasing, but they are severely hampered by economic constraints and access to technology. The business community on the other hand, is actively exploiting the networks as a means to establish contacts and secure investments. This group is faced with a different set of economic constraints. Unlike the individual, the business community have three avenues of communication -- public telephone lines, private leased lines and satellite links. They share the same gateways, satellites and landlines of IASNET, RELCOM, and GlasNet. Therefore the relations between the business community and the research and academic community are complicated by technological entangle- ments. In the long-run xUSSR will need all three of these user groups to build an information infrastructure and to open xUSSR to the international community. In summary, main networks in the xUSSR provide a variety of services, including e-mail, teleconferencing, and access to BBSs and databases. The development of on-line services is slowed down by economic, ideological, and technical factors. IV. SOCIAL EFFECTS In this section we consider a set of realized and latent social effects of networking in the xUSSR. They are: political democratization, the telecommunications and computer industry developments, forging of invisible colleges among scientists, spreading of computer-mediated interpersonal and mass communication, and negating the old information model that generated the distorted picture of social reality. What structural changes to the xUSSR society has been introduced by information technology? What are some of these changes? To examine this question have considered the following trends: democratization (the failed 1991 coup); the structuring of society; the development of a computer and telecommunications industry; and dissolution of the Soviet society's unrealistic self-image. Taken together these represent potential social reform for the xUSSR and an opening to the international community. 1. Democratization: The Failed 1991 Coup The failed coup of 1991 hailed significant political changes for the xUSSR. The Communist Party's tight grip on the government was released. While the long term changes are unclear, there is no doubt that life has changed in the xUSSR. The Russian government now supports a more demo-cratic system. Our focus here is on access to and control of information during the coup and the role networkers played in the failure of the 1991 Soviet coup. If they sought to close down telecommunication links they were ineffective. Did coup leaders (|The Committee|) fail to grasp the powerful broadcasting potential and informing abilities of telecommunications systems and computer networks? Where they too distracted by the events taking place in the streets of Moscow and elsewhere? The answers to these questions are not yet known, but it is clear that coup leaders failed to sever electronic communication links, and access to the networks. Land lines and satellite links remained operational throughout the four-day coup. We briefly discuss computer networking during the coup to illustrate the democratic characteristics of this networking. The following account is based on information gathered from e-mail postings, articles and personal networking by the authors. While the world looked on in amazement, a group of stalwart Communist Party members sought to snatch power from the elected Russian leaders and from the Russian people. Americans sitting in hotels around Moscow learned of Gorbachev's internment at 9am Monday, August 19th, from a CNN broadcast. (27) People resting at the International Hotel, just blocks from the White House, watched CNN broadcast events outside the White House on August 19th and 20th. These events were never broadcast on Soviet television. (28) Foreigner's visiting Moscow for an IFLA conference learned of the coup events from worried relatives during phone calls from the United States. (29) Boris Yeltsin's first statement defying the coup leaders and calling for support against The Committee was distributed across Russia using a combination of photocopy, facsimile, electronic mail and verbal communications. (30) All of his speeches were distributed in this manner. (31) At one point Yeltsin may have contacted the "outside world" from the besieged White House over a cellular phone obtained >from a visiting American executive. Communication into and out of the White House was never seriously threatened. (32) While the coup leaders initially closed down independent television and radio stations, they ignored dedicated and public telephone lines, packet-switches and satellite links. They also overlooked access to photocopy machines and telefax equipment. As the official television and radio stations broadcast opera, telephones lines and computer networks were clogged with messages about the events unfolding in Moscow, Leningrad, and elsewhere. Hours before the release of any official "news," information about the coup had spread via computer networks throughout Russia and to the outside world. At the height of the confrontation at the White House, one could make a phone call from a public phone booth just blocks away. (33) At 5:01 am on August 19th, Vadim Antonov, a senior computer programmer at the DEMOS cooperative posted early news of the coup on RELCOM: Oh, do not say. I've seen the tanks with my own eyes. I hope we'll be able to communicate during the next few days. Communists cannot rape the Mother Russia once again! (34) Within hours messages like this were copied and distributed through out xUSSR. Messages were also sent worldwide via an Internet link in Finland. Once on the Internet, news about the coup rapidly spread around the world. Individuals around the world joined the revolutionary spirit by relaying the messages posted from Russia. By midday August 19th, information collected by Interfax, the independent Soviet news agency, Radio Moscow World Service, the Russian Information Agency, Northwest Information Agency, and Baltfax were being disseminated by RELCOM. (35) In the middle of the second day of the coup an independent radio station, Echo Moskey, was back on the air broadcasting from a roving van. (36) RELCOM was the principle network used to distribute information about the coup. From the DEMOS headquarters, information was sent to all 70 network nodes where it printed and distributed. Networkers relaying messages, stripped off names and network address to protect the senders who feared persecution if the coup succeeded. (37) There was suspicion that the KGB knew about the network activity, but either chose not to interfere or was unable to jam the network. GlasNet was used to send and receive messages through the San Francisco Moscow Teleport (SFMT) to the United States, Northern and Western Europe, and United Kingdom. GlasNet provided information on events in Leningrad and Moscow via news feeds from CNN and the BBC. The volume of traffic on the phone lines became so heavy on August 19th that a call went out to all networkers worldwide to stay off the net unless they were posting vital information. Please stop flooding the only narrow channel with bogus messages (and) with silly questions. Note that it's neither a toy nor a means to reach your relatives or friends. We need the bandwidth to help organize the resistance. Please, do not (evenunintentionally) help those fascists. (38) Phone line traffic was 100 times normal. An additional 24 circuits on the Soviet Intersputnik satellite were activated to accommodate the heavy demand. Land and satellites links operated without disruption for voice, facsimile and electronic mail. (39) Amid the events at the White House it was life as usual for many people and business in the xUSSR. During the coup, foreign companies with access to dedicated lines, packet-switched networks, or cellular phones communicated both within xUSSR and across international boarders. Two package delivery services, DHL and United Parcel Service, continued to operate uninterrupted throughout the coup. For Control Data Corp. and Borland Inter-national business went on uninterrupted in their Soviet offices. Some businesses did feel threatened and sent employees home. (40) Many people in Moscow and else-where in xUSSR were unaware of coup events until late Tuesday. Many accounts of day-to-day life in Moscow suggest that the disruption was limited to the White House, Red Square, Gorbachev's dacha in the Crimea, and to a few other hot spots in Leningrad. Darrell P. Hammer wrote about his experiences on Monday: I decided to go to the center and see for myself. But first I took a walk of several blocks. I was living in Otradnoe on the north edge of Moscow. Here there was no evidence of any emergency. At the Kirov market the Azeri farmers were in their usual place, selling fresh fruit and defending their high prices.. to outraged housewives.(41) During the coup, the computer network became a broadcasting operation. Net-workers acting as unofficial correspondents posted information and political commentary. Bob Clough, a business manager for Nantucket Corp., based in Moscow, provided CompuServe users with on-the-scene reports of events via a telephone link through Finland. (42) Telecommunication network systems and information technology became a distributed publishing service -- a freedom press. While there is still much to be learned about the coup, clearly information techno-logy played a significant role in this historic event. While CNN televised images of the coup, it was not these images, but words of men like Yeltsin that held sway for Russian citizens. The "desk-top publishing" metaphor is applicable for the way Yeltsin communicated with the Russian people. Within hours of Yeltsin's statement in defiance of coup leaders, handbills reproducing his statement papered the walls of the Moscow metro. These same statements were sent to Leningrad, and the United States. The speed with which information about the coup spread helped the constitutional government and their supporters mount a timely defense of their newly won civil rights. The Russian networker, Antonov, writing about nets and the coup said that "computer communications are more democratic by nature then mass media like TV or news-papers . . . ." (43) He further asserted that there is no central authority in a computer network. This naive yet enthusiastic ideal-ism aboutthe promise of electronic net-works has a ring of truth for the Soviet society. However, several questions regarding access and control of information technology persist. Some of these are of a technical nature: Who will regulate the telephone or telecommunication lines and the electrical power needed to operate the computer networks? Who will maintain the lines themselves? Some questions are political: Who has access to the network? How will does the cost of networking effect network access use? The evidence we have gathered support the notion that networkers did play a role in the failed coup. They distributed information throughout xUSSR and to networkers worldwide in a timely and effective manner. The networkers distributed information to others who did not have direct access to RELCOM or GlasNet. Networkers also distributed information generated by non- Soviet sources like the BBC and CNN. The majority of citizens may have had no knowledge of the electronic networks, but the information the they received was vital to their ability to take action angainst the coup. For many politicians and business people, the networks had the direct benefit of enabling communications during the coup. The excitement of playing a role in such a historical event is undeniable. George Tereshko wrote: When the dark night fell upon Moscow, RELCOM was one source of light for us. Thanks to these brave people we could get information and hope. (44) The use of RELCOM news services and GlasNet during the coup illustrates the broadcasting potential of computer net-works. Computer networks may become a mass information media in the xUSSR by linking the rich tradition of underground publishing in the USSR (samizdat) with networking. The networker's contribution to the resistance was due, in part, to the novel situation and their unexpected exploitation of the network. These activities exemplify the social and political aspects of networking. The coup supports the following observations: |The structure of networks supported the communication activities of the networkers. It enabled them to create, reproduce, and gather information; |The networks were transformed into a broadcasting medium. |It facilitates collaboration of geographically decentralized networkers. |The networks provided a means for collaboration by a diverse group of individuals. No one paid attention to disciplinary or social distinctions. 2. Invisible Colleges It may seem remarkable to us how little individual Soviet scholars and scientists know about each other and their work. The general lack of communication within the USSR is apparent. Computer networking seems to be shifting academic collaboration to more open exchange of personal and professional information. Postings on the xUSSR networks are typical of what we see on the Internet: sharing biographical data; research interests and project information; asking and answering questions; discussing and debating issues. The introduction of computer networking is educating xUSSR researchers about what is going on in their electronic backyard. (45) What we see being posted on these networks is typical of the ways people build a common ground and become part of or establish a group with like interests. According to Hiltz and Turoff, among others, formation of particular social groups is facilitated via interlinked computers or computer mediated communications (CMC). Two such groups are invisible colleges and hackers. The former is of a particular interest in our research. The invisible college is a social and poliical group of scholars, scientists and researchers. Traditional documentation of invisible colleges is through citation analysis and other formal indicators. While the academic community has yet to incorporate computer networking into their evaluation policies, there is much evidence that networking, including the publication of electronic texts, is increasing. It seems probable that computer networking will become a standard practice for scholars, scientists, and researchers. The invisible college is transforming computer networking from formal discipline oriented groups, to groups bound by political and topical concerns. We posit that computer networking will enable discourse between the business, academic and general population and thereby undermine the discipline orientation of the invisible college. A new form of social grouping will merge. Signs of this trend are evident in the xUSSR. Scientific institutions holding elitist status in the xUSSR, may hold on to distinguished roles in the era of networking. These institutions are likely to form the core of future computer networks. The IAS and IOH are central to two of the main computer networks is evidence of this trend. These institutions are the movers and shakers of networking, rather than mere network nodes. This is so, in part, because they already have computing resources appropriate for networking. By having the qualifications needed to become a networking agency IAS, IOH and other scientific institutions, satisfy conditions to facilitate invisible colleges. Networks will continue to have government support even in the somewhat changed economic conditions, which include the principle of economic self reliance. These institutions are competent in technical networking theory and engineering. Invisible colleges may come into existence and live through electronic links, such as e-mail and computer conferencing. The electronic invisible college phenomenon seen in other countries should develop in the xUSSR. In the case of xUSSR, it may well take on new characteristics and forms. The electronically configured invisible colleges are as hidden to the public eye as were those in the time of Sir Francis Bacon, the 18th century creator of the idea of an invisible college. What differentiates today's invisible colleges from their ancestors are the type of network links. 3. Development of the Computer and Telecommunications Industry The Soviet government has failed to develop two essential technologies for computer networking: the building and maintaining of computer hardware and telecommunications facilities. What they have managed to do is manufacture clones of IBM and DEC mainframes, and IBM micro- computers. Telephone communications are in poor shape. Without a computer industry, the USSR relied on importing and cloning computer hardware. Government restrictions caused import problems. The Coordination Committee (COCOM) rigorously controlled exports of computer technology to the USSR and CMEA. The effects of COCOM restrictions were to some extent balanced by some national markets that served as a Trojan horse for computers entering the USSR. The Soviet telephone system has been chronically in poor shape. The Soviet leadership's desire to restrict privacy, combined with failing to grasp the importance of basic telecommunications, can be blamed for the bad condition of telephone networks in the xUSSR. The Soviet government used all means to limit personal privacy. Limiting access to telephone and computer networks was part of this policy. In contrast, significant investments were made in telecommunications facilities linking Communist Party's officials. Improvement of both the computing and telecommunications industry may be expected in the xUSSR. In 1991, COCOM lifted a substantial portion of the export prohibitions. The list of the state-of-the-art computer technology approved for export to the xUSSR continues to grow. This may stimulate the existing cloning industry. The integration of xUSSR into Western markets will impose keener intellectual property regulations on the xUSSR. The telecommunications infrastructure of the xUSSR is being transformed from a relatively primitive system, by current standards, to one able to handle major value added information services. It is not likely that the xUSSR governments will undertake a major rebuilding of the telephone network. The vast geographic distances between user groups (cities, e.g.) is a major concern. The problem is partially alleviated by satellite links, which have always been in better shape in Russia than their land phone lines. Foreign capital investments are being sought to rebuild telecommunications networks. MCI, Sprint, and AT&T are examples of foreign interests pushing hard in the xUSSR market. These companies are developing commercial networks that will provide various value added services including e-mail and data transfer. From a policy perspective, we see an interesting trend. In addition to the presence of foreign telecommunication's providers presence, joint ventures have formed to establish telecommunications facilities. In this paper we have noted two -- SFMT and SovAm teleport. If this trend continues, perhaps the countries of the xUSSR will be among the first European countries divesting telecommunications from government monopolies. The development of networking is favorable now that both computer and telecommunications technology are recognized as key elements of the xUSSR information infrastructure. Once part of the technology development cycle, building and maintaining computer networks will influence the development of national computer and telecommunications industries. Here is one possible scenario. Since networking requires special computer hardware and software, imports of these to the xUSSR will probably continue. However, they will probably stay within moderate limits because of hard currency shortage. To compensate the domestic computer industry will try to fill the void. GlasNet is an example. Attempting to cope with the problem of noisy telephone lines, the GlasNet management discarded the idea of importing high quality modems. Instead, they helped initiate the domestic computing industry to produce equivalent modems. This may happen with multiplexers, concentrators, repeaters, routers, and switches (communication computers) and other network hardware. To summarize, the telecommunications industry can be supported by networking developments. The negligence of Soviet leadership in not developing and maintaining public telecommunications might be overturned by the demand for reliable and fast intercomputer links. Foreign capital will play a key role in forging the new information infrastructure. Despite the current financial problems in Russia, it is a large market which is capable of supporting a lucrative telecommunications industry. 4. A Soviet Information Model The Soviet society's self image was idealized not realistic. The image did not reflect political and economic conditions. The image was based on a specific information model outlined in this section. We hold that computer networking can be one of the factors influencing dissolution of theSoviet information model. The changes that are taking place in the countries of the former xUSSR are still not structural ones. An important structural change would be the break of the old information model and emergence of less constrained and open system-like forms of communication. Voluntaristic Commands and Distorted Feedbacks The Soviet information model is a closed system. Its core is the "master unit" which embodies the top leadership of the Communist Party and the national and state governments. Under the master unit are complex tree-like "slave structures" or transmission mechanisms. In the economic subsystem, these slave structures relay information from the master unit to state-owned enterprise managers, and down through to individual workers. The same happens in the cultural and other sub-systems. Thus, all downward flows carry command information, such as what and how to manufacture goods, or what themes and how to present them in movies. The upward flows are feedbacks that parallel the hierarchical structures layer by layer up to the master unit. These feedbacks are actually just responses to the senior-level command inputs. Both downward and upward information is decoupled from factual reality. Commands are voluntaristic, i.e., made up of ideals and wishes rather than based on real capacities and conditions. The evidence on this is most striking in economic domain (for examples see Winiecki, 1991). If the aviation ministry makes the decision on a new type of plane, the plane must be produced regardless the price. Similarly, the responses to commands do not reflect reality. One reason is that there are too many levels that upward information has to jump over; every jump increases the probability of information distortion. Another is due to vested interests of the feedbacks creators. Here is an illustration based on the relationship between managers and the party officials. The officials pass the senior level party directives to managers. The managers try to match production indicators to the directives regardless the real outcomes. The local party officials know that information is incorrect. However, they comply with it because they share responsibility for production outcomes The whole process distorts the image of reality, so that possibly no single person really knows what is going on in any social domain. The Political Aura of Information Next characteristic of the Soviet information model is that all information has an political aura. This applies both to public and the most of non-public information. The latter has, in general, very little room to exist because the domain of privacy is restrained by many means. One of which is an individuals participation in pervasive networks called 'collectives' (see Shlapentokh, 1989). Collectives cover all the domains of an individual|s life -- from neighborhood to work place -- and deal with all aspects of the individual's life -- from political attitudes to drinking habits. Another way of looking at the political aura of Soviet information is to acknowledge the lack of clear content-based distinctions between information kinds, such as economic, technological, organizational, artistic and interpersonal information. All the distinctions are blurred by the dominant political dimension of information. This phenomenon is also called the 'dominance of ideology' (e.g., Shlapentokh, 1986). The political aura is imposed by the overall command function of the information system. Also by the self-perpetuation of the social rulers. In other words, information is instrumentalized for ruling purposes. Examples from arts, mass media and public speech follow. Politically instrumentalized artistic information is typical to the USSR. The USSR has a history of applying social realism as the way of art and artistic conduct. (See for example, Graffy, and Hosking, 1989). Artistic information is channeled by various para-political institutions, such as associations of writers and composers. These associations help reify and extol artistic expression conforming to the rules of social realism. The main purpose of politically instrumentalize artistic information is to glorify the Soviet system. By portraying the system in a rosy color, this information generates unrealistic images. Mass media have been instrumentalized by the top party leadership and by bureaucracy. Direct links between mass media, like broadcasters and the Communist Party were institutionalized (46). Mass media was an apologist for the Soviet rulers -- the party-government officials. The unrealistic content of the mass media information was indicated by its non-communicative language. For example, Soviet surveys suggest that a majority of the audience did not understand the media language (47) The third generator and disseminator of politically instrumentalized information has been non-mediated networks generated by Communist Party members and sympathizers. These face-to-face networks transmitted the party's world view to the masses. The networks used to be generated through political campaigning, a particular form of public speech. The party members and sympathizers campaigned on a regular basis and in a variety of forms. (48) Some researchers hold that these nonmediated networks were the primary source of the party's power by providing the party with 'inviolable' contact with the masses. (49) The Soviet information model is characterized by information comprised of voluntaristic commands, distorted feedback, and the dominant political dimension. All the information is decoupled from factual reality. Channels for the information are various non-mediated networks like those generated through political campaigning. The overall outcome of the information system is that the whole society sustain a distorted image about itself. Can computer networks help subvert such a system? We believe they can. In particular: | networks may undermine the political aura of information, because they encourage individual free speech, the expression of personal interests, and the taking of actions; | networks are loose associations of independent individuals, and they undermine political instrumentalization of information; | networking is a private act -- the more one is engaged, the greater one's sphere of privacy. Consequently, networks in xUSSR may reduce the collectives space; | networks enable people with similar political interests and opinions to find each other and generate action; and | networks may become independent broadcasting media, in contrast to the traditional electronic media which are less likely to be released >from the government control. SUMMARY In this paper we described the technical infrastructure of four main computer networks in the xUSSR. Then we discussed the main services provided by the networks, and databases and online services. Finally, several social effects of the networks that either actually occurred or could occur in the long-run were analyzed. We believe that conditions are in favor of developing networking in the xUSSR at an increasing pace. In addition, networks already have had social effects and more effects are to be expected. The 1991 coup case shows that networks were channels of information otherwise inaccessible, and generators of anti-coup action. In addition to supporting the social democratization, networks can also facilitate emergence of invisible colleges, the development of telecommunications and computer industry, and dissolution of the information system that has been decoupled from factual reality. REFERENCES Buckle, David. "57th IFLA Conference and Exhibition, Moscow -- a Russian Adventure." OCLC Newsletter No 193(1991 Sept/Oct):12-15. Caulkins, David. Director of GlasNet, On-line Survey, December, 1991. Graffy, Julian and Geoffrey A. Hosking. Culture and the Media in the USSR Today. New York: St. Martin Press, 1989. Hammer, Darrell P. "The Coup - a Memoir." Distributed on Russia- L, 1 and 3 September 1991. Hiltz, Starr R. Online Communities: A Case Study of the Office of the Future. Norwood: Ablex Publishing Company, 1984. Hiltz, Starr Roxanne and Murray Turoff. The Network Nation: Human Communication via Computer. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1978. 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Quittner, Joshua. |Tales of the Net that Said Nyet.| New York Newsday, August 28, 1991. RELCOM Information gathered from RELCOM administrators through e- mail, 1991. Remington, Thomas F. "Words and Deeds: CPSU Ideological Work," in Michael P. Sacks and Jerry G. Pankhurst, eds., Understanding Soviet Society. Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1988. Remington, Thomas F. The Truth of Authority: Ideology and Communication in the SovietUnion. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1988a. Romanov, Genady, the IASNET administrator. On-line survey, December 1991. Shlapentokh, Vladimir. Public and Private Life of the Soviet People. New York: Oxford University Press, 1989. Schlapentokh, Vladimir. Soviet Public Opinion and Ideology: Mythology and Pragmatism in Interaction. New York: Praeger, 1986. Sproull, Lee, and Sarah Kiesler. Connections: New Ways of Working in the Networked Organization. Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1991. Quarterman, John. The Matrix: Computer Networks and Conference Systems Worldwide. Digital Press, 1990. Tanenbaum, Andrew. Computer Networks. 2nd ed. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1988. Valauskas, Edward and Monica Ertel. "Moscow Diary: IFLA & the Coup, August 19-21, 1991." Apple Library User Group Newsletter 9:4(Oct 1991):79-84 NOTES (1)Andrew Tanenbaum, Computer Networks, 2nd ed. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1988. (2)Robert K. Mueller, Corporate Networking: Building Channels for Information and Influence, New York: The Free Press, 1986. (3)Lee Sproull, and Sarah Kiesler, Connections: New Ways of Working in the Networked Organization, Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1991. (4)Starr Roxanne Hiltz, and Murray Turoff, The Network Nation: Human Communication via Computer, Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1978. E.B. Kerr, and S.R. Hiltz, Computer-Mediated Communication Systems: Status and Evaluation, New York: Academic Press, 1982. Starr R. Hiltz, Online Communities: A Case Study of the Office of the Future, Norwood: Ablex Publishing, 1984. (5)Genady Romanov, the IASNET administrator, On-line Survey, December 1991. (6) John Quarterman, The Matrix: Computer Networks and Conferencing Systems Worldwide, Digital Press, 1990. (7)IAS Information gathered from IASNET administrators through e- mail, 1991. (8)Romanov. (9)IAS Information. (10)Romanov. (11)RELCOM Information gathered from RELCOM administrators through e-mail, 1991. (12)Ibid. (13)David Caulkins, Director of GlasNet, On-line Survey, December, 1991. (14)Evgeny Mironov, the SUEARN administrator, On-line Survey, December 1991. (15)Andrej Mendkovich, SUEARN Developments, Network Coordination Center document NCC-I008.91, 6/17/1991, 1991. (16) Mironov. (17) Mendkovich. (18) Werner Klotzbuecher, "Online Behind the Old Iron Curtain: Computer-Assisted Information and Communication with CMEA Countries," Online 15:2(March 1991). (19)Romanov. (20)RELCOM information. (21) Caulkins. (22) Mendkovich. (23) Sergei Mayorov, and Leonid Polyakov, "Online in the Soviet Union," Online 15:4(July 1991), 105. (24)Ibid. (25)Ibid. (26)Ibid. (27)David Buckle, "57th IFLA Conference and Exhibition, Moscow -- a Russian Adventure," OCLC Newsletter No 193(Sept/Oct), 1991. (28)Darrell P. Hammer, "The Coup - a Memoir," Distributed on Russia- L,1 and 3 of September 1991. (29)Edward Valauskas, and Monica Ertel, "Moscow Diary: IFLA & the Coup, August 19-21, 1991," Apple Library User Group Newsletter 9:4(Oct 1991): 2. (30)Tom Masland, ||||||||How the Resistance Spread the Word,|| |Newsweek 118:10(Sept 2, 1991):39. (31)Joshua Quittner, |||Tales of the Net that Said Nyet,|| New York Newsday, August 28, 1991. (32) Hammer. (33) Ibid. (34)Larry Press, |A Soviet Computer Network During the Coup,| A posting on SUEARN, Sept. 7, 1991. (35)Ibid, 8. (36)Hammer. (37)Press, 8. (38)Quittner. (39)SUEARN Digest, 1991. (40)Ibid. (41)Hammer (42)SUEARN Digest. (43)Quittner, 42. (44)Press, 10. (45) Igor Yastrzhemsky, SUEARN Digest, 1991. (46)Thomas F. Remington, "Words and Deeds: CPSU Ideological Work," in Michael P. Sacks and Jerry G. Pankhurst, eds., Understanding Soviet Society. Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1988. (47)Thomas F. Remington, Thomas F., The Truth of Authority: Ideology and Communication in the Soviet Union, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1988. (48)Remington, |Words and Deeds: CPSU Ideological Work," 154-155. (49)Mueller, 2.