RL 311/91 September 3, 1991 Leading Plotters in the Armed Forces Stephen Foye The failed coup attempt has already led to the arrest of two top military leaders and to the ouster of a number of others. While much has still not been revealed about those who took part in the coup, it is now possible to identify a number of senior officers who were implicated in the plot and to look at their activities both during the putsch and in the period that preceded it. While it will undoubtedly take some time for a complete picture of the recently staged coup d'etat to emerge, it is already clear that Soviet military officers played a major role in the operation and that a number of them face imprisonment--or worse--as a result.1 From the fragmentary evidence that is now available, it is possible to sketch the actions of some of those military leaders most implicated in the coup and to examine their moves in light of what is known of their career backgrounds and their political views. Those Arrested Marshal Dmitrii Yazov, Minister of Defense. Yazov, a member of the short-lived State Committee for the State of Emergency in the USSR, has been stripped of all his command responsibilities and is now under arrest. Named defense minister in May, 1987, following the landing of a small, private German aircraft on Red Square, Yazov was viewed at the time as a Gorbachev-style reformer and was promoted ahead of a number of more senior officers. Earlier, from 1984 to 1986, he served as commander of the Far Eastern Military District, where he gained the reputation of being a strict disciplinarian and an advocate of glasnost' in army life. It was here that he reportedly first caught the attention of Mikhail Gorbachev, who brought him to Moscow in the last weeks of 1986 as the new deputy defense minister in charge of the Main Personnel Administration. Gorbachev has since intimated that Yazov spearheaded the housecleaning of top defense personnel that began at that time.2 Yazov was presumably appointed defense minister less than a year later in order to oversee Gorbachev's planned reform of the Soviet armed forces. In April, 1990, he was made a marshal of the Soviet Union. As the Soviet political spectrum shifted to the left in the years after he came to Moscow, however, Yazov came increasingly to be regarded as a conservative opponent of liberalization; he was particularly angered by media criticism of the armed forces and antimilitary sentiment in the non-Russian republics. Gorbachev nevertheless stood by Yazov, winning his confirmation as defense minister following a stormy hearing in the USSR Congress of People's Deputies in July, 1989, and successfully nominating him again in February of this year.3 In fact, Gorbachev's relations with Yazov appeared particularly amicable during the Soviet president's rapprochement with conservative forces in late 1990 and the spring of 1991. During that same period, and right up to the coup attempt, Yazov himself grew increasingly militant in his criticism of the reform process. In June of this year, he, along with the heads of the KGB and the Ministry of Internal Affairs, forcefully condemned perestroika during a closed session of the Supreme Soviet, and he was implicated in the aborted right-wing "coup" attempt led by Prime Minister Valentin Pavlov.4 At the same time, Yazov increased the intensity of his attacks on the so-called new thinking in Soviet foreign policy and, in February, appeared to call for the rejection of the Conventional Forces in Europe treaty that had been agreed upon the preceding November.5 Whatever his background, Yazov's public statements during the coup and his standing as Defense Minister would, in any event, have marked him as one of the leading conspirators, and he was apparently an early participant in the operations that led to the seizure of power early in the morning of August 19. According to an RSFSR people's deputy, Vladimir Lysenko, Yazov was one of four officials who visited Gorbachev in the Crimea on August 18 and tried to coerce him into assenting to the conspirators' demands.6 Yazov then returned to Moscow late that Sunday night and attended a meeting of the conspirators in the capital only hours before the coup was launched.7 Deputy Defense Minister Colonel General Yurii Yashin relates that he was called back from a holiday by Yazov to attend a meeting at the Defense Ministry at 6:00 am on Monday morning, August 19.8 Yashin said that military leaders were surprised by the announcement of a state of emergency but that they initially carried out those orders issued by Yazov. Komsomol'skaya pravda subsequently published what it said was a coded directive signed by Yazov at the onset of the coup.9 Addressed to Soviet army units, the directive referred to "the deteriorating domestic political situation," canceled leave and put troops on alert, and called for "cooperation...with healthy forces in local organs of power and with USSR KGB and MVD organs." It was reportedly issued at 4:30 am on August 19. Anecdotal reports have long indicated that Yazov was not much respected within the armed forces themselves, and his actions during the coup attempt appear to support the view that he was a leader of limited abilities. On the evening of August 20, for example, rumors began circulating in Moscow that Yazov had resigned from the Emergency Committee because of failing health.10 Although the rumors were immediately denied, it seems that Yazov did experience second thoughts about the endeavor. On August 27, a Defense Ministry spokesman said that Yazov had been a reluctant participant in the coup effort and that once he had been talked into it he found that "it wasn't possible to turn back."11 An unidentified Yazov aide said that Yazov was "quite simply of another generation" and that loyalty to "the Party and the Central Committee" were values sacred to him. The same aide also argued that, "if it hadn't been for Yazov, there would have been a hundred times more bloodshed."12 Yashin, who has clearly tried to deflect criticism from the army, expressed a similar view. He portrayed an indecisive Yazov who had joined the conspiracy and then got cold feet.13 Yashin described a meeting of the Ministry of Defense Collegium early on the morning of Wednesday, August 21, which was presided over by Yazov and attended by the entire High Command (with the exception of Army General Valentin Varennikov). The Collegium reportedly asked Yazov to leave the Emergency Committee and sought to issue an order withdrawing troops from Moscow. According to Yashin, Yazov was "tense and very agitated" and said: "I got into this, and I now have to think about making a declaration on getting out of it." Yashin said that, nevertheless, the assembled leadership gave the order for the troops to withdraw at approximately 9 am that morning, before it was clear that the coup would fail. He said that it also decided to cancel curfew orders, to inform the Supreme Soviet of its decisions, and to demand that the Supreme Soviet examine the actions of the Emergency Committee.14 Later in the day, a Defense Ministry spokesman announced that Yazov was still on the job.15 In fact, Yazov was apparently already on the run. Several days later, he lamented: "I very much regret what happened. In the final analysis, it brings shame on the armed forces...and I am responsible."16 Army General Valentin Varennikov, Commander in Chief of Ground Forces. Varennikov appears to have been a key figure in the recent coup attempt. One of the most experienced commanders in the Soviet armed forces, the sixty-seven-year-old general led troops in World War II and, some forty years later, served a four-year stint as head of the Defense Ministry Operational Group overseeing the war effort in Afghanistan.17 Over a ten-year period, from 1979 to 1989, Varennikov also served as first deputy chief of the General Staff. He was appointed commander in chief of Soviet Ground Forces in May of 1989 and, in the same year, was elected to the USSR Congress of People's Deputies. Although appointed by Gorbachev, Varennikov was obviously not a representative of the younger, post-war generation of Soviet commanders who were so often advanced in the years of perestroika. Varennikov has made no secret of his opposition to political liberalization and to republican autonomy movements. Late in 1989, he wrote an article suggesting that a legal basis be established for using the Soviet army as a domestic police force.18 Early this year, the liberal journal Ogonek published a directive reportedly authored by Varennikov that ordered army units to conduct a telegram campaign in support of Leonid Kravchenko, the conservative head of what was then Gostelradio.19 On March 13, he appeared on Soviet television with two other top commanders to proclaim his support for "a united and undivided Union." Their comments were typical of the High Command's increasing politicization on the eve of the referendum on the Union treaty on March 17.20 Most recently, Varennikov gained renewed notoriety for signing the conservative manifesto "Slovo k narodu," which was published in Sovetskaya Rossia.21 This open letter warned that the Soviet Union was disintegrating and advocated a military coup to reverse the process. The letter was also signed by Colonel General Boris Gromov, the former army commander now serving in the Internal Affairs Ministry. In addition, Varennikov has expressed dissatisfaction with Soviet foreign policy, and early this year he criticized NATO for not responding to the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. He hinted that the terms of the CFE agreement should be rethought as a result.22 Of equal importance is the fact that Varennikov has, over the past year, emerged as one of the High Command's most implacable opponents of independence for the Baltic republics and has played a high-profile role in both negotiations and military operations conducted in the region. In December, 1990, Varennikov signed an appeal to Gorbachev that called for the imposition of presidential rule in so-called trouble spots. In January, 1991, he arrived in Vilnius to take control of military operations only days after the brutal attack that left fourteen dead,23 and on January 19 he said that the actions of the Lithuanian parliament had outraged him.24 On February 1, he was appointed to a delegation charged with holding negotiations with the Latvian government. Varennikov's exact role in the recent seizure of power remains murky, but the fact that he--along with Yazov--is one of only two officers actually to be arrested attests to the extent of his involvement in the coup effort.25 He appears to have been directly responsible for military actions in the Baltic republics but, despite his arrest, few details of his actions have been revealed. He apparently operated independently of the military high command as a whole, a proposition that is supported by the fact that on August 21 he was the only member of the Defense Ministry Collegium not present at the morning meeting described by Yashin. Varennikov's relative autonomy would also be consistent with theories that he was part of a differentiated command structure that consisted of only select army commanders together with their counterparts in combat units of the KGB and MVD. His long years of involvement in Afghanistan also undoubtedly brought him closer to such people as Colonel General Boris Gromov and Colonel General Yurii Shatalin, both of whom now command Interior Ministry Troops. More mysterious is the fact that the Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk claims that Varennikov visited him on the day of the coup (presumably August 19) in order to enlist his support.26 Kravchuk claimed that one reason he left the Communist Party was because Varennikov appeared to be "acting not only on behalf of the army but also on behalf of the Party." Those Suspected Army General Mikhail Moiseev, Chief of the General Staff. At the time of writing, Moiseev has not been charged directly with complicity in the coup attempt, yet the fact that he has been relieved both as chief of the General Staff and as acting defense minister suggests that he is suspected of being implicated.27 Although it was rumored in Moscow on August 20 that Moiseev would replace the "ailing" Yazov on the Emergency Committee, there is apparently little physical evidence at this time to directly link the former chief of the General Staff to the coup. According to some reports, Moiseev was on vacation at the time the coup was launched.28 An RSFSR legislator said that Moiseev claimed to have beem caught unawares by the coup and to be disgusted by Yazov's, Interior Minister Boriss Pugo's, and KGB Chairman Kryuchkov's anticonstitutional actions.29 In Komsomol'skaya pravda of August 22, moreover, Moiseev was quoted as saying that the army was incapable of turning its weapons against the people and that neither officers nor soldiers were to blame for the coup.30 On the same day, however, Izvestia accused Moiseev of complicity in the plot. The newspaper referred to a conversation that its correspondents had allegedly conducted with the chief of staff of the Moscow Military District, a General Lieutenant Zolotov, several days before the coup began. When asked whether the army had formulated plans for seizing important urban centers, Zolotov replied that "oral" orders had been given by Deputy Defense Minister Vladislav Achalov, while coded telegrams to the same effect had been issued by Moiseev.31 A "Vesti" radio commentary the same day interpreted the Izvestia report to mean that, during the coup, a troop division had been deployed in Moscow on the secret orders of Moiseev. Named acting defense minister by Gorbachev, also on August 22, Moiseev was stripped of all his command responsibilities only twenty-four hours later. Colonel General Nikolai Kalinin, Commander of the Moscow Military District. Kalinin has not been arrested, but is reportedly being "interrogated" for his role in preparing and staging the coup.32 It appears that he willingly took on the mantle of Moscow's "military commandant" during the coup, and he appeared on national television on August 20 to announce the imposition of a curfew and other emergency measures in the nation's capital.33 A rising star on the eve of the coup, Kalinin now appears to be firmly implicated in a crime that will cut short his military career. Kalinin was born in 1937. He was appointed head of the prestigious Moscow Military District in February, 1989, following three years as a first deputy commander of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany. He is a former commander of Airborne Troops and, in 1989, was elected on the Communist Party platform to the USSR Congress of People's Deputies.34 Colonel General Fedor Kuz'min, Commander of the Baltic Military District. Like Kalinin, Kuz'min has been relieved of his command for assuming emergency powers during the initial hours of the coup. Also born in 1937, Kuz'min assumed control of the critical Baltic command in January, 1989. Previously, he served as first deputy commander of the Leningrad Military District. Kuz'min too is a USSR people's deputy, having been elected from a constituency in Latvia in 1989.35 In fact, Kuz'min showed signs of being a moderate when he first went to the Baltic, apparently participating in a Defense Ministry plan drawn up in 1989 that made concessions to the Baltic republics on questions of conscript service.36 He eventually became embroiled in the escalating battle between the center and the republics on the question of Baltic sovereignty, however, and came increasingly to be seen as a tool of Moscow. His actions during the coup are also likely to short-circuit what was a promising military career. He has been replaced by Lieutenant General Valerii Mironov, himself a former first deputy commander of the Leningrad Military District. The Rest. At the time of writing, a number of other top military leaders have been accused, in one way or another, of complicity in the coup, and other names will undoubtedly follow. On August 27, for example, a Moscow-based newspaper published what it claimed was an encoded directive from the notorious commander of the Volga-Ural Military District, Colonel General Al'bert Makashov.37 It said the military district had supported the actions of the Emergency Committee, urged more resolute actions against Russian President Boris El'tsin, and called for the implementation of a state of emergency in Samara and Sverdlovsk. The message was also reportedly signed by three other generals and was sent to Yazov, Moiseev, First Deputy Defense Minister Konstantin Kochetov, Chief of the Main Political Administration of the Soviet Army and Navy Colonel General Nikolai Shlyaga, Deputy Defense Minister Colonel General Vladislav Achalov, and several civilian Party and government leaders. A Moscow Radio broadcast on August 31, meanwhile, also named Shlyaga and Achalov as plotters.38 In addition, it pointed the finger at Colonel General Aleksandr Ovchinnikov, a first deputy head of the Main Political Administration; Colonel General Aleksandr Soshnikov, identified as a military adviser attached to Emergency Committee member Oleg Baklanov; and Lieutenant General Mikhail Surkov, secretary of the All-Army Party Committee.39 Shlyaga has since been ousted as head of the Main Political Administration.40 On August 20, in the middle of the coup, Surkov stepped forward to deny rumors that Yazov and KGB Chief Vladimir Kryuchkov had stepped down from the Emergency Committee, and his days too seemed numbered. The top leadership of the Soviet Air Defense forces has also been implicated in the coup, and its commander in chief, Army General Ivan Tret'yak, has been releived of his command. According to the new head, Colonel General Viktor Prudnikov, more significant changes in the top echelons of the Air Defense leadership are already in the works.41 Another rising star whose future is now uncertain is Colonel Valerii Ochirov, until recently the deputy chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Defense and State Security Committee. On August 19, Ochirov claimed that the army would follow the Emergency Committee. "I exclude [the danger] of a split," Ochirov said, "The army will carry out the will of the [new] legal government."42 The people's deputy also said that morale in the High Command was high and that power should have been seized a year earlier. He compared the coup to Pinochet's seizure of power in Chile. On August 30, the Defense and Security Committee, long criticized by reformers, was dissolved by the USSR Supreme Soviet for its passivity during the coup.43 Ochirov's military career will probably not long outlast it. 1 On August 28, the RSFSR Prosecutor's Office charged the leading plotters with high treason. If found guilty, the accused could receive the death penalty (see Reuters, September 2, 1991.) Among the seven was Dmitrii Yazov. On September 3, four more plotters were officially charged with treason, including Valentin Varennikov (see AFP, September 3, 1991). 2 For biographical information on Yazov and background on his career, see Alexander Rahr, RL 212/87, "Why Yazov?" June 1, 1987; Alexander Rahr, "Gorbachev Discloses Details of Defense Council," Report on the USSR, No. 37, 1989, pp. 11-12. 3 See Stephen Foye, "Yazov Survives Contentious Appointment Debate," Report on the USSR, No. 29, 1989, pp. 9-11; TASS, February 28, 1991. 4 For background on the Pavlov-led "coup," see Dawn Mann, "An Abortive Constitutional Coup d'Etat?" Report on the USSR, No. 27, 1991, pp. 1-6. 5 Pravda, February 23, 1991, p. 2. 6 RFE/RL Russian service, August 22, 1991. 7 AFP, August 28, 1991. 8 Financial Times, August 24, 1991. 9 Komsomol'skaya pravda, August 27, 1991, p. 3. 10 AP and CNN, August 20, 1991. 11 AFP, August 27, 1991. 12 AFP, August 27, 1991. 13 Financial Times, August 24, 1991; AFP, August 24, 1991. 14 On the Ministry of Defense order, see TASS, August 21, 1991. Yashin also argued that the Defense Ministry was the first state institution to actively oppose the coup. 15 TASS, August 21, 1991. 16 Russian Television, August 24, 1991. 17 For biographies of Varennikov, see Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil, No. 10, 1989, p. 5; Alexander Rahr, A Biographical Directory of 100 Leading Soviet Officials, Boulder, Westview Press, 1990, pp. 185-86. 18 Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil, No. 18, 1989, p. 22. 19 Ogonek, No. 7, 1991, p. 4. 20 TASS, March 13, 1991. 21 Sovetskaya Rossiya, July 23, 1991, p. 1. 22 Voennaya mysl', No. 2, 1991, p. 16. 23 The Washington Post, January 15, 1991. 24 Reuters, January 19, 1991. 25 Yazov's and Varennikov's immunity as people's deputies has been lifted (see AP, August 22, 1991). 26 The Daily Telegraph, August 28, 1991. 27 For biographical information on Moiseev and his temporary appointment as Defense Minister, see Stephen Foye and Alexander Rahr, "Gorbachev Appoints Temporary Heads of Army, KGB, and MVD," Report on the USSR, No. 35, 1991, pp. 13-15. 28 The Washington Post, August 23, 1991. 29 Interfax, August 22, 1991. 30 As reported by Radio Moscow, August 22, 1991. 31 As reported by Radio Moscow, August 22, 1991. 32 TASS, August 27, 1991. 33 AP, August 20, 1991. 34 For a biography of Kalinin, see Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil, No. 10, 1989, p. 9. 35 For a biography of Kuz'min, see Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil, No. 10, 1989, p. 13. 36 See Stephen Foye, "Growing Antimilitary Sentiment in the Republics," Report on the USSR, No. 50, 1989, pp. 1-4. 37 Rossiiskaya gazeta, August 27, 1991, p. 1. The newspaper Ural'sky rabochii has since reported that Makashov has been relieved of his command (Russian Television, "Vesti," September 3, 1991). 38 Radio Moscow, August 31, 1991. 39 Also named in the report was a Lieutenant Guchmazov, identified as the main organizer of the coup in the office of Prime Minister Pavlov. 40 Radio Rossii, August 29, 1991. 41 TASS, September 3, 1991. 42 Reuters, August 19, 1991. 43 Interfax, August 30, 1991.