RL 315/91 August 30, 1991 FOREIGN MINISTRY ADRIFT Sallie Wise The attempted coup in Moscow revealed the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs to be adrift without leadership. Gorbachev dismissed Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh for his "passivity" during the putsch, but Bessmertnykh has denied allegations that he !0 collaborated with the Emergency Committee, maintaining that he did not support the putsch. The Foreign Ministry and Soviet embassies abroad kept a low profile during the attempted coup, with some Soviet ambassadors prepared to support the Emergency Committee. Foreign policy initiative effectively passed to the RSFSR and President Boris El'tsin together with his foreign minister, Andrei Kozyrev, which, in the wake of the putsch, raises the issue of "dual power" in Soviet foreign policy. The hours of the putsch in Moscow were not the Soviet Foreign Ministry's finest. On vacation at the time of the coup, Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh remained silent and out of sight. He did not come forward to denounce the State Committee for the State of Emergency in the USSR until August 21, claiming that he had been ill. Reports filtering out from Soviet embassies around the world suggested that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the erstwhile flagship of "new thinking," was adrift during the coup. Several Soviet ambassadors said they received no instructions or information from Moscow for three days.1 On August 23, USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev dismissed Bessmertnykh for his "passivity" during the attempted coup.2 Bessmertnykh, a career diplomat who specialized in American affairs, took office last January after Eduard Shevardnadze, warning of an impending dictatorship, resigned in December, 1990. During Bessmertnykh's tenure, the Foreign Ministry played a less prominent role than it had under Shevardnadze. Bessmertnykh lacked both Shevardnadze's personal access to Gorbachev and his forcefulness and international stature. Although he continued Shevardnadze's policies and projected himself as an advocate of "new thinking," Bessmertnykh was less an innovator than a technician. Still, he enjoyed a reputation as a liberal, and reports issued at the time of the attempted coup that he, like Gorbachev, was "ill" raised concerns that he, too, was being detained by the leaders of the putsch.3 Where Was Bessmertnykh? Although Bessmertnykh has asserted that charges he was passive are unfounded, Gorbachev declared at the session of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet held on August 23 that, during the coup, Bessmertnykh was "trying to maneuver, or worse."4 On August 27, Bessmertnykh released a three-page, handwritten letter to the USSR Supreme Soviet in which he stated that, on August 18, he had turned down an offer to join in the coup attempt.5 Although he had previously pleaded illness as an excuse for his low profile during the coup, he claimed in the letter that he had been in his office during the attempted takeover, trying to avert damage to the USSR's foreign relations. On the day that Bessmertnykh was dismissed from office, Komsomol'skaya pravda carried a report that appeared to justify Gorbachev's suspicions.6 The article alleged that Bessmertnykh had had a meeting with coup leader Gennadii Yanaev in the Kremlin on the morning of August 19, during which he was informed of the Emergency Committee's intentions and received its appeal to foreign governments. The article further stated that Bessmertnykh returned to the Foreign Ministry, ordered distribution of the Emergency Committee's document, and left. Included in the same issue of Komsomol'skaya pravda was an open letter to Bessmertnykh from RSFSR Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Fedorov, charging that the Emergency Committee's appeal was, in fact, distributed to Soviet embassies on Bessmertnykh's order. Fedorov's accusations were given credence by former Deputy Prime Minister Vladimir Shcherbakov's account of a meeting held on the eve of the attempted coup.7 According to Shcherbakov, Bessmertnykh, along with USSR Supreme Soviet Chairman Anatolii Luk'yanov, took part in a meeting of coup leaders held in the Kremlin on August 18, during which he initialed the order declaring a state of emergency. Soviet Diplomats React to Coup Owing to the state of confusion at the Foreign Ministry, which was virtually incommunicado (with the exception of the Emergency Committee's appeal disseminated on August 19), Soviet diplomats abroad were left to their own devices.8 Most of them emulated Bessmertnykh and kept mum, waiting to see what would happen. Ambassador to Prague Boris Pankin did, however, distance himself from the junta and declare his allegiance to Gorbachev, although there are conflicting reports about the timing of his statement.9 It appears that he did not make an announcement to the Czechoslovak news agency CTK until late on August 20 or early on August 21, by which time reports of strong resistance to the coup had surely reached Prague. Nevertheless, on August 28, a week after the attempted coup had collapsed, Gorbachev rewarded Pankin by appointing him foreign minister. The few hapless ambassadors who blundered ahead and acted on behalf of the Emergency Committee have, since the coup's failure, backpedaled furiously. Perhaps the best known is Leonid Zamyatin, a longtime member of the Foreign Ministry and ambassador to Great Britain at the time of the putsch. In a letter to The Independent published on August 27, he averred that rumors of his "wavering" during the attempted coup were "absolutely false."10 Zamyatin's denial, however, contradicts reports issued last week that he had sought to convince British Prime Minister John Major that Gorbachev was, in fact, ill. A British journalist who interviewed Zamyatin at the beginning of the takeover reportedly said that Zamyatin described the coup as "constitutional" and accused the journalist of being "a supporter of [RSFSR President Boris] El'tsin."11 Other members of the Soviet embassy staff in London came out early and resolutely against the junta.12 The RSFSR Takes Charge of Foreign Policy While Gorbachev was in detention and Bessmertnykh was "indisposed," Soviet foreign policy was left in a vacuum. As in most other matters of governance during the putsch, El'tsin stepped into the breach and appealed to the world for support against the Emergency Committee. In his open letter to Bessmertnykh, Fedorov revealed that, early on August 20, El'tsin had instructed him to send a special telegram to all Soviet embassies and consulates abroad "with an explanation of the Russian leadership's position and a condemnation of the coup d'etat."13 He added, however, that USSR First Deputy Foreign Minister Yulii Kvitsinsky issued an order to stop the telegram. Bessmertnykh had apparently left Kvitsinsky, whom Nezavisimaya gazeta described as "having, in the past, shown himself to be an active supporter of perestroika and an honest man,"14 in charge of the Foreign Ministry. Undaunted, El'tsin dispatched RSFSR Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev to Paris on August 20 to lobby for international support for democratic resistance to the coup.15 French authorities expressed their readiness to accept a Russian government-in-exile headed by Kozyrev should the need arise. Kozyrev also planned to go to Washington and the United Nations, but the coup failed before he left Paris. International condemnation of the attempted coup, in addition to the threatened suspension of economic aid, bolstered El'tsin's resolve and undoubtedly contributed to the wavering of the coup's leaders. What Now? The paralysis of the USSR Foreign Ministry and the ambivalent behavior of its senior officials during the attempted coup suggest that "new thinking" had not permeated the upper echelons of the ministry to the degree that Gorbachev might have wished. Bessmertnykh's low profile contrasted starkly with Shevardnadze's presence at the barricaded RSFSR government building. Before Pankin's appointment was announced, some 3,500 employees of the Foreign Ministry had signed an appeal to Shevardnadze, asking him to assume his former post.16 It can be expected that younger, "newer" thinkers will rise to replace cautious senior diplomats who were not quick enough or resolute enough in condemning the junta's threat to democracy--and to Gorbachev's foreign policy. In the wake of the attempted coup, a fundamental question has arisen in all spheres of policy: Who is in control? El'tsin's arrogation of powers and responsibilities previously held by the central government has created a situation of dvoevlastie, or dual power. This situation could potentially have a bearing on the USSR's relations with other countries and on its treaties and agreements. Moreover, as has been widely discussed in the international media, the question of control over the USSR's nuclear arsenal--which is dispersed among several republics--is of paramount importance. Particularly disquieting are reports that, during the attempted coup, the Emergency Committee confiscated Gorbachev's briefcase containing nuclear codes and communications equipment.17 Newly appointed Foreign Minister Pankin has said that he sees no particular problems in relations between the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the analogous ministries in the republics. In his view, the Union will set strategic priorities and coordinate all foreign political activities.18 Perhaps desirable in theory, this goal may prove difficult to achieve in practice. Foreign leaders now mention El'tsin in the same breath with Gorbachev. In addition, republics other than the RSFSR also want to exercise greater control over their relations with the outside world. It is far from clear, in the aftermath of the putsch, whether the authority of the all-Union government, including the Foreign Ministry, can be restored. With the center's authority waning and that of the republics on the rise, central coordination of the USSR's foreign policy may grow increasingly difficult in the coming months. 1 As reported by Soviet Ambassador to Portugal Gennadii Gerasimov on NBC's "Today" show, August 22, 1991, and an RFE/RL correspondent in Washington, August 22, 1991. 2 TASS, August 23, 1991. 3 CNN, August 20, 1991. 4 Central Television, August 23, 1991. 5 AP, August 27, 1991. 6 Komsomol'skaya pravda, August 23, 1991. 7 Financial Times, The New York Times, August 28, 1991. 8 Nezavisimaya gazeta, August 21, 1991. 9 AP, Reuters, August 21, 1991. 10 The Independent, August 27, 1991. 11 TASS, August 27, 1991. 12 The Independent, August 29, 1991. 13 Komsomol'skaya pravda, August 23, 1991. 14 Nevavisimaya gazeta, August 21, 1991. 15 Reuters, August 20, 1991. 16 AP, August 28, 1991. 17 The Washington Post, August 23, 1991; AP, August 27, 1991. 18 Interview with RFE/RL's Russian service, August 29, 1991.