RL 318/91 August 30, 1991 Changes in the El'tsin-Gorbachev Relationship Alexander Rahr RSFSR President Boris El'tsin has emerged as the great political winner in the aftermath of the coup, outflanking Gorbachev by virtually taking over the powers of the center. Other republics fear a replacement of the former center by a new "Russian center" headed by El'tsin and are reluctant to sign the Union treaty. RSFSR President Boris El'tsin has used the political momentum of the failed coup attempt to seize power in a disintegrating Soviet Union. USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev has lost his former political power base, and his fate now seems to be heavily dependent on El'tsin. It is El'tsin, not Gorbachev, who currently controls the executive organs of the Soviet state, and it is El'tsin who appears to enjoy greater authority in the armed forces. In the aftermath of the failed coup, El'tsin's policy seems to be directed towards a further weakening of the embattled Soviet president. His aim is to make Russia the core of a restructured Union by swallowing the center and placing himself at the head of the process of building it. The leaders of the other republics have, however, viewed with skepticism the recent appointment of RSFSR officials as temporary heads of all-Union government bodies. The leaders of Ukraine and Kazakhstan, who had previously agreed to sign the new Union treaty, have begun to voice grave concern over the replacement of the "Soviet" center by a "Russian" one under El'tsin. El'tsin Outflanks Gorbachev El'tsin has been able to embark on the process of strengthening Russia's role because his position is stronger than that of Gorbachev. The latter has lost the Communist Party apparatus and the Cabinet of Ministers. The majority of the members of the USSR Security Council and the USSR Defense Council betrayed him and are now in jail. The KGB and army leaderships, on which Gorbachev relied heavily in the six years of perestroika, are also being revamped, and the president's authority in the USSR Supreme Soviet is lower than ever. He has also been deprived of "the special powers" granted to him by the Soviet parliament last year. Gorbachev has thus lost his entire political power base as a result of the coup, and his fate now seems to depend entirely on the Russian president. El'tsin, who assumed supreme political and military power in the Soviet Union during the coup, is reluctant to hand back the reins to Gorbachev. He is insisting that the two men share power in the Kremlin and is participating in the government of the entire Soviet Union, not only of Russia. So far, Gorbachev has done little to resist El'tsin's demands. On the second day of the coup, El'tsin appointed himself commander in chief of all Soviet armed forces on Russian territory "until the operation of the constitutional bodies and institutions of state power and government of the USSR are restored in full."1 He also issued a decree placing all central Soviet organs of executive power in Russia under his control. On his return to Moscow, Gorbachev issued a decree recognizing the justness of El'tsin's actions under the extraordinary conditions prevailing during the coup. The Russian president did not subsequently relinquish the powers he had acquired during the coup, however, but won the right to control the armed forces and the KGB jointly with Gorbachev. In a new arrangement, Gorbachev and El'tsin will assume the other's powers if one or the other is prevented from exercising his authority. If, for whatever reason, Gorbachev is unable to perform his duties, his presidential powers will not automatically be transferred to the USSR vice president, but to El'tsin. In order to minimize the danger of control over the Soviet Union's nuclear arsenal falling into the wrong hands, as is alleged to have occurred during the coup, a joint control mechanism has been introduced according to which strategic weapons cannot be used without the consent of both the RSFSR and the USSR presidents.2 El'tsin demonstrated his new authority over nuclear weapons in the recent talks between the RSFSR and Ukraine. He stated that, since Ukraine had declared itself a nuclear-free zone, it could not claim nuclear weapons and that, if Ukraine were to opt for independence, the weapons would immediately be relocated to the RSFSR.3 El'tsin has insisted on the appointment of Air Force head Colonel General Evgenii Shaposhnikov as the new Soviet defense minister. Shaposhnikov's first deputy, Lieutenant General Pavel Grachev, who formerly commanded the Airborne Troops, is also a El'tsin appointee. Both men were promoted because of their resistance to the Emergency Committee. Grachev has also been made chairman of the newly created RSFSR State Committee for Defense Questions, which is the equivalent of a republican defense ministry.4 The all-Union military chain of command will, therefore, be firmly under the control of the RSFSR; ultimately, the Soviet army may even become the Russian army. Gorbachev and El'tsin have also agreed to restructure the USSR presidential structures that proved incapable of shielding the president from the coup. In future, El'tsin and other republican leaders will belong to the USSR State Council, which will be entrusted with examining all strategic questions relating to the Union and control over the army and KGB. The State Council is supposed to replace the Defense Council. In the immediate aftermath of the failed coup, El'tsin succeeded in putting his people into all manner of existing all-Union structures. In fact, the RSFSR government under his leadership all but placed the all-Union decision-making process under its supervision. Furnishing Gorbachev with evidence of the complicity of the entire USSR Cabinet of Ministers in the coup, El'tsin won Gorbachev's approval for the appointment of RSFSR Prime Minister Ivan Silaev--a close associate of El'tsin--as the de facto leader of the USSR government. Silaev is currently heading an interim commission charged with running Soviet government affairs until a new Cabinet of Ministers is installed, and members of the RSFSR Council of Ministers have been appointed provisional heads of key federal institutions and ministries. President of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbaev was reportedly furious when El'tsin and Gorbachev named one Russian after another to lead the new all-Union government. When it was suggested that a non-Russian might become vice president, Nazarbaev said sarcastically, "Thank you."5 Under pressure from the republics, some revisions have since been made to the system, with a number of non-Russians being given responsibility for all-Union affairs. The Russian position, however, is still dominant. El'tsin also pressed Gorbachev to hand over to him Soviet government communication lines previously run by the KGB. Moreover, El'tsin is directly involved in breaking up the monopoly of the central KGB organization.6 Most of the powers of the all-Union KGB have already been taken over by the RSFSR KGB, and Sergei Stepashin, chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Committee on Security, has been appointed to lead the investigation into KGB involvement in the coup. Finally, El'tsin has seized control over finances by placing the State Bank directly under RSFSR jurisdiction and has made all foreign exchange operations and those involving precious metals and stones contingent on RSFSR approval.7 Russian Democrats See Role for Union Gorbachev, whose authority has been seriously damaged by the coup, first refrained from engaging in a new conflict with El'tsin. On August 28, however, during a session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, he changed tack and warned El'tsin that his constant interference in all-Union affairs was not acceptable. Gorbachev stressed that it had been proper for El'tsin to issue decrees touching on the responsibilities of the center during the coup but said that, as the coup was over, Russia and its president must stop becoming directly involved in all-Union affairs.8 Aleksandr Yakovlev, who appears to be acting as Gorbachev's adviser once again, indirectly warned El'tsin against overstepping his authority. Yakovlev said that he did not think that El'tsin was capable of governing the Soviet Union and that he should concentrate on his responsibilities in the RSFSR.9 Yakovlev called for a strict balance to be maintained between the two leaders. RSFSR State Councillor Sergei Stankevich also warned his boss that a new conflict with Gorbachev would only strengthen the USSR president's position, because the republics prefer Gorbachev to a strong Russia under El'tsin.10 Leningrad Mayor Anatolii Sobchak has emerged as the main defender of the Union. He told the USSR Supreme Soviet that the center should remain as a coordinator and arbiter between the republics and that the USSR Supreme Soviet should continue to function as "a symbol of state power." In Sobchak's view, only the three Baltic republics should be granted immediate independence. He said that other republics must negotiate independence with the center. When politicians in Ukraine and Kazakhstan--the two other republics besides Russia where nuclear weapons are deployed--hinted that they might consider holding on to the weapons, Sobchak insisted that such a scenario must not be allowed to happen. Here Sobchak sided firmly with El'tsin, rejecting the idea that nuclear weapons might be controlled by the republics and arguing that, if the center was too weak to take responsibility for its nuclear arsenal, Russia would have to take over the Soviet armed forces.11 A similar view was expressed by economist Grigorii Yavlinsky who is now a member of Silaev's provisional governing committee. Yavlinsky emphasized that, if the republics were unable to decide on the formation of a union, Russia would proceed with economic reforms itself.12 Prospects The Soviet Union has ceased to exist, but the republics may soon agree on a new but quite different kind of union. If that happens, El'tsin will cooperate with Gorbachev but will be careful not to miss any opportunity to further weaken the center. El'tsin is determined to stick to the strategy of subordinating the USSR president completely to the republics--especially to Russia. RSFSR Prime Minister Silaev left no doubt of his and El'tsin's intention to weaken the center. Although he has just been entrusted with forming a new central government, Silaev maintains that he regards the future role of the center as "minimal." According to Silaev, the center will deal only with promoting reforms by creating a favorable climate for privatization and investment in those republics that want to cooperate on economic issues. Silaev stated that the center in its present form would disappear "if not in days then in weeks."13 1 Radio Moscow, August 20, 1991. 2 See press conference given by Aleksandr Rutskoi (Reuters, August 26, 1991). 3 TASS, August 28, 1991. 4 TASS, August 24, 1991. 5 The Washington Post, August 29, 1991. 6 TASS, August 24, 1991. 7 Interfax, August 28, 1991; Radio "Mayak," August 28, 1991. 8 Central Television, August 28, 1991. 9 Liberation, August 24, 1991. 10 AFP, August 28, 1991. 11 TASS, August 29, 1991. See also The Baltimore Sun, August 29, 1991.