RL 312/91 August 27, 1991 THE IDEOLOGY OF THE SOVIET MILITARY Stephen Carter The attempted coup d'etat in Moscow was prepared by the military-industrial complex and certain elements within the Party in an effort to preempt the Union treaty and reverse perestroika. Strictly speaking, it was not a military coup, but the Ministry of Defense and the High Command were so deeply implicated that 80 percent of all senior officers are now to be replaced. Military journals such as Voenno-istorichesky zhurnal had been publishing antidemocratic articles since at least 1989, which suggests ideological preparation for the recent events. This ideology was an unconvincing mish-mash of Stalinist national bolshevism and lacked wide support in the armed forces. The clumsily executed coup by the clumsily named State Committee for the State of Emergency in the USSR has collapsed. Although its initial decrees were signed by Gennadii Yanaev or the civilian members of the eight-man committee, this was essentially a military-KGB-MVD coup, supported by conservative Party members. A strong warning signal had been issued a month earlier by an open letter published in Sovetskaya Rossiya on July 23. This letter was couched in the strongest possible terms. It denounced democratic processes, perestroika, and the handing over of power to "frivolous and clumsy parliamentarians." The letter stated that the army would "step forward as the bulwark of all the healthy forces in society." How could it happen,the letter asked, that "we allowed into power those who do not love this country, who fawn on foreign patrons, and who seek advice and blessings across the seas?" The appeal was addressed to a very wide audience including working people, laboring peasantry, engineers, religious leaders, and political parties in an effort to convey the impression of popular appeal; but the major sources of support were clearly to be the armed forces and the Communist Party. The letter concluded by stating that a group of statesmen and economic experts was ready to take power.1 The letter was signed by twelve people including the writers Bondarev, Rasputin, and Prokhanov; the serving deputy ministers Generals Varennikov and Gromov; and Vasilii Starodubtsev and Aleksandr Tizyakov, who subsequently appeared in the Emergency Committee. Commentators such as Archie Brown immediately observed that Gromov and Varennikov should have been fired,1 but the Western world generally failed to notice the significance of Gorbachev's powerlessness. In reality, the forces of reaction had been busy for months, if not years. In 1988, Gorbachev announced unilateral force cuts of 500,000 men at the United Nations, and the chief of the General Staff, Marchal Sergei Akhromeev, resigned. This crucial event may have nullified the view expressed by Dale Herspring that, "by the end of 1988, the idea of a defense minister like Grechko, one who would openly advocate policies opposed by the political leadership, seemed very unlikely".3 By early 1989, there were signs that the High Command was distancing itself from perestroika and developing an ideology inimical to the democratization process. Was Marshal Yazov himself involved in this move by the High Command? At the time of his appointment in May, 1987, Yazov was believed to be a Gorbachev supporter. However, at least from 1989, an official journal of the USSR Defense Ministry, Voenno-istorichesky zhurnal, was steadily producing a series of extraordinary articles. The militarist writer Karem Rash was given great prominence in this journal, taking the lead article in no fewer than seven issues up to September.4 As Mikhail Tsypkin of Radio Liberty pointed out,5 Rash's ideas seemed to be permeating certain areas of the national security community. Rash actually supported the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, saying that the Soviet army had tried to oppose the formation of a military bloc including the USA and Pakistan in that region. Rash advanced the idea that 100 officers were invariably superior to 100 civilians of any profession. In subsequent articles, Rash argued for military intervention in politics. "Who recently saved Poland from national chaos, anarchy, and humiliation? Who held her fast on the edge of an abyss? The Polish army!"6 Rash believes that the army is the guardian of Russian national and imperial traditions, and the journal has published many articles glorifying the Russian imperial army in World War I and earlier. "The military," says Rash,"should feel that they are the backbone and sacred institution of a thousand years of statehood." He supported officers' assemblies on the tsarist model and expressed his belief that the assemblies could have a role to play in politics. Rash went so far as to claim the cultural traditions of Pushkin and Lermontov (among others) for the army, and in later articles he proposed a far-reaching social role for the army that really amounted to a militarization of Soviet society. Rash created a succes de scandale for the journal under its militant editor General Filatov, but surprisingly the publication was credited with an encouraging note of appreciation by Marshal Yazov in 1989.7 Although articles by Rash did not appear in Voenno-istorichesky zhurnal after September, 1989, he became a member of the editorial board in November,1989, and still retains this post in 1991. The leadership of this journal passed to Filatov. Rash's views were attacked by Ogonek as racism,8 which prompted Rash to compare the liberal editor Korotich to the traitor Vlasov. Recently, Rash's views have become eccentric. His admiration for Hitler's Third Reich has grown to a marked extent,9 and he has developed a slightly crazy national-social theory of agronomy. He claims that the true Russian of the future must be a kulak, a type promoted by Stolypin. The kulak favored the oak tree or the lime, pine, or cedar because they have roots and preserve the soil from erosion. He criticizes the cultivation of "tree-weeds" such as the silver birch. "No...agrarian people takes the birch tree or the aspen as its symbol. The birch tree is the tree of the era of the city lumpen and the educated rubbish separated from its native roots that may be called the "lumpelligentsia."10 Rash is fond of neologisms and believes that the real ethnic or racial basis for a future state is contained in Russia, Ukraine, and Belorussia. These peoples he names the pravorossii,11 a term that presumably originates in a mixture of the concepts "Russian," "Right," and "Orthodox." However, Rash also praises Nazi racial theories of natural selection and the pagan origins of Russian culture, specifically referring to the influence of Il'ya of Murom and Taras Bulba.12 The philosophy of Rash is essentially Russian militarism, but it is dressed up in "culturally respectable" references buttressed by suspect statistics,13 false analogies, and increasingly weird neologisms. However, he claims to be a liberal-conservative in politics, on the model of Pushkin. Equally extreme has been the direction of Voenno-istorichesky zhurnal in 1990-91. Under the editorial control of Filatov, the journal launched a vitriolic campaign against the liberal ("yellow") press personified by Ogonek, Moscow News, Komsomol'skaya pravda, and Literaturnaya gazeta. The term "democrat" developed into a term of abuse throughout 1990-91, while the journal published only letters of support, giving the impression of a widespread following. By the time that Filatov published an extract from Mein Kampf in November, 1990, the journal claimed a circulation of 377,000, as compared with 27,000 two years earlier, although circulation actually dropped significantly in 1991. It need hardly be stressed that the journal was in favor of a conscript army and an all-Union Ministry of Defense, as opposed to the reformist ideas of Major V. M. Lopatin, who is attacked very strongly, particularly for his opposition to Party organizations within the army.15 The remaining most salient views of Voenno-istorichesky zhurnal will be summarized under various headings: 1. Comparison of the Period 1986-90 with the "Revolutionary years' after 1917 A history teacher, N. Ya. Serova, compares the popular attitudes of today with closely similar views obtaining in the period immediately after 1917, when, as today, patriotism was regarded as "black-hundredism" and chauvinism. Free love was advocated, and this is compared with the pornography and sexual license of today. The army was unjustly criticized then, as it is today, when in fact it was the guardian of national values such as patriotism. We need a new patriotic ideology, says Serova, to combat the "demonocracy" of the elite oligarchy.16 2. Opposition to Solzhenitsyn Liberal Russian nationalism such as that of Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, which is specifically anti-Stalinist, is opposed by the national bolsheviks. Voenno-istorichesky zhurnal ran several articles insinuating that Solzhenitsyn was a Vlasovite, that he was involved in an anti-Soviet bloc in 1945, and that he should not be 'idolised'.17 Referring to Solzhenitsyn's arrest in 1945, a letter to the journal remarks: "Believe me, an old soldier; in 1945 any joker who said anything against Stalin among the soldiers would not have been arrested but shot where he stood like a stray dog."18 3. History Should Serve the Interests of the Army and the Party General Volkogonov's reevaluation of the role of Stalin in the first days of the war is not only attacked but annihilated in an interview with Marshal S. F. Akhromeev. The marshal is very concerned that historians should serve the interests of the army and the Party. Referring to Volkogonov's publications, Akhromeev comments: "This notorious untruth about the Great Patriotic War would be used to undermine the integrity of our country, for the subversion of its Socialist policy, and, consequently, as a means of discrediting the CPSU. We cannot allow this."19 4. Support for Beria and the NKVD In an editorial, Filatov himself equates the democratic forces, and particularly Ogonek with treason. "It is a pity there is no Beria; if he had read today's Ogonek, he would have shot half (of the staff) and sent the remaining rubbish to rot in a camp."20 The journal also cites the case of a state prosecutor, G. G. Suslov, who was implicated in the Tukhachevsky trial and subsequently suffered interrogation and imprisonment.21 Incidentally, the journal also goes out of its way to cast doubt on Marshal Tukhachevsky's character and social origins (22). 5. Hostility towards Trotsky The journal radically criticizes Trotsky's record as commissar for war, attacking his ruthlessness towards political commissars and his general arrogance. Another article censures him for his conduct of the negotiation of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk with Imperial Germany in 1918.23 6. "Reactionary Revisionism"--Katyn 1940, Hungary 1956 The journal has published a number of articles and other materials, including "Third Reich" documents that purport to prove that the statement by TASS accepting responsibility for the Soviet execution of Polish officers at Katyn Wood was in fact erroneous and that the whole affair might well have been a provocation.24 In respect of another supposed "rectification" of one of the blank pages of Soviet history--namely, the invasion of Hungary in 1956, Janos Kadar is approvingly quoted to indicate that the (now acknowledged) popular uprising in Budapest was in fact a "counterrevolutionary attempt."25 7. Hostility towards the "New Political Thinking"; Support for Iraq General Filatov was the only Soviet war correspondent to be invited into Iraq, and he reported that, since Saddam Hussein's army had not been destroyed, he (Hussein) had not been defeated. Basing this argument on the doctrines of von Clausewitz, Filatov went as far as to say that Hussein had emerged victorious.26 Like the conservative Communists and such extreme right-wing groups as "Pamyat'," Filatov was apparently dismayed by Gorbachev's "Western" policy towards the Soviet Union's former client-state Iraq. 8. "Stalinist" Simplification of Politics Stalin's Short Course History of the CPSU(b) actually bracketed together all his political enemies into a single "Trotskyite-Zinovievite-Kamenevite White Guard Fascist bloc."27 In an analogous manner, Filatov claims that all his enemies are a kind of bloc. He claims that Korotich and Solzhenitsyn are Vlasovites, and he associates them with "Baltic fascists and Ukrainian followers of Bandera."28 This oversimplification enables Filatov to conclude that "every generation has its followers of Bandera and Vlasov, and every generation has its Stalingrad."29 Presumably some of those who supported the actions of the Emergency Committee were supposed to believe that they were fighting a kind of "civil Stalingrad." 9. Fascination with Hitler's Reich The well-known "expansionist" map published by the German Nazi Party in 1938 depicting its war aims in the period 1938-48 was one of the many Nazi documents published in 1990-91. Fear of the newly united Germany, not supported by any convincing arguments, is coupled with what appears to be a concealed admiration for the Third Reich.30 10. Support for a Military Coup A learned article entitled "Parallels in Military History" compared the oddly coincidental dates separating the Napoleonic and Nazi invasions of Russia but concluded that Bismarck, Lloyd George, and Clausewitz had been right to warn against an invasion of Russia and, especially, of any attempt to occupy it. The crucial quotation in this article is from Clausewitz: "Such a country can only be conquered by its own weakness and the effects of internal discord." The conclusion seems to be that the army's duty is not only to repel external invaders but also to maintain internal order. This is, in effect, a justification for the seizure of power, in certain circumstances, by the army.31 It should be noted in this connection that other journals, such as Nash sovremennik (No. 6, 1991) have carried threatening articles on the subject of military coups. Viktor Eremin of the "Vityaz" (Champion) Society wrote a long and extremely angry article in which he argued: The chief and only function of the army is the preservation of the statehood of the people and the territorial integrity of that statehood....And this is why, when the civil state power is falling apart and is not in a condition to...defend national statehood...and begins to act in the interests of foreign groups hostile to the people, the army not only has the right but also the duty to become extremely involved in internal affairs.32 The ideologists of national bolshevism and of military coups have been militantly active since at least 1989, but how strongly are these views supported within the Soviet armed forces? Those who planned and executed the recent coup made a number of crucial mistakes. Their chosen instrument of initial intimidation was the army. Yet we know that several units went over to El'tsin's side, including the Taman Motorized Rifle Division and the Tula Division. A heavy tank division and possibly the 106th Ryazan Airborne Division also sided with the forces of democracy. There were many examples of fraternization between conscript soldiers and the crowds defending the Russian parliament. Moreover, in the RSFSR elections for the presidency in June, it appears that about 50 percent of all officers in the Leningrad Military District voted for El'tsin, compared with about 64 percent of the civilian population.33 Officers of the rank of colonel and above, and a very large number of officers in the High Command and General Staff (with the honorable exception of Kobets and Shaposhnikov) seemed to be against Gorbachev and El'tsin, but junior and middle-ranking officers seemed to be far more "democratic." Conclusion The ideology of the Soviet military appears to have assumed some unpleasaNtforms in recent years, especially in the journal Voenno-istorichesky zhurnal. Although the motives of the many groups and individuals who supported the coup must have been numerous, including self-interest among those who held high office under the old regime, the role of ideology should not be ignored. Actively encouraged by the USSR Ministry of Defense and Marshal Yazov, Russian nationalists and writers and editors who were fanatically hostile to democracy were published and "recommended" to the Soviet officer corps. The ideas propounded, if widely applied after a successful coup, would have plunged the USSR and international relations into the very depths of Stalinist national bolshevism and a new Cold War. If there are now to be trials of the military conspirators, should there not also be a widespread campaign for the political education of the Soviet officer corps? ^ 1 Sovetskaya Rossiya, July 23, 1991. 2 The Los Angeles Times, July 30, 1991. 3 Dale Herspring: The Soviet High Command--1967-89, Princeton, 1990, p. 261. 4 Voenno-istorichesky zhurnal, Nos. 2-9, 1989. 5 M. Tsypkin, "Karem Rash: An Ideologue of Military Power," Report on the USSR, No. 31, 1990, pp. 8-11. 6 Voenno-istorichesky zhurnal, No. 4, 1989, p. 4. 7 Voenno-istorichesky zhuranl, No. 8, 1989, p. 2. 8 Ogonek, No. 2, 1990, pp. 8-9. 9 Literaturnaya gazeta, No. 1, 1991, p. 3. 10 Ibid., p. 2.M  11 Nash sovremennik, No. 5, 1991, p. 5. 12 Ibid., p. 8. 13 Rash has claimed, for example, that 6 percente.g. in 'Pravda'(22.2.89) Rash claims that 6per cent of teachers in Sweden are women, thus forming effeminate young men among their pupils. 14 Voenno-istorichesky zhurnal, No. 11, 1990. 15 Ibid., pp. 88-90. 16 Ibid., pp. 21-26. 17 Voenno-istorichesky zhurnal, No. 9, 1990, p. 19. 18 Voenno-istorichesky zhurnal, No. 11, 1990, p. 66. 19 Voenno-istorichesky zhurnal, No. 4, 1991, No. 4, 1991, p. 35. 20 Voenno-istorichesky zhurnal, No. 11, 1990, p. 96. 21 Voenno-istorichesky zhurnal, No. 8, 1989, pp. 67-71. 22 Voenno-istorichesky zhurnal, No. 12, 1990, pp. 88-90. 23 Voenno-istorichesky zhurnal, No. 2, 1991, pp. 45-48. 24 Voenno-istorichesky zhurnal, No. 12, 1990, pp. 39-40; No. 4, 1991, pp. 79-92. 25 Voenno-istorichesky zhurnal, No. 9, 1989, pp. 42-50. 26 Voenno-istorichesky zhurnal, No. 3, 1991, p. 96. 27 J. V. Stalin, The Short Course History of the CPSU(b), Moscow, 1939. 28 Voenno-istorichesky zhurnal, No. 1, 1991, p. 96. 29 Voenno-istorichesky zhurnal, No. 2, 1991, p. 96. 30 Voenno-istorichesky zhurnal, No. 12, 1990, pp. 18-21. 31 Voenno-istorichesky zhurnal, No. 5, 1991, p. 44. 32 Nash sovremennik, No. 6, 1991, pp. 144-51. 33 "Weekly Record of Events," Report on the USSR, No. 25, 1991, p. 33.