RL 294/91 August 21, 1991 Lithuania Signs Treaty with Russia Gytis Liulevicius In a treaty signed on July 29, Lithuania and the RSFSR recognized each other's independence and formalized relations. The negotiating teams forged agreements on delicate issues, especially the question of Lithuanian citizenship for Russian immigrants. In conjunction with the main treaty, the two states concluded an agreement on Kaliningrad Oblast and moved to establish respective representations in Vilnius and Moscow. The treaty and its protocols indicate a growing trend of individual republics pursuing independent foreign policies without regard for the center. The signing ceremony stood in sharp contrast to the latest "superpower summit," which began the following day. While the United States and the Soviet Union signed an aged arms control agreement, Lithuania and Russia held a summit of their own that emphasized the erosion of power from the center. Lithuanian Supreme Council Chairman Vytautas Landsbergis met RSFSR President Boris El'tsin on July 29 in Moscow to sign a comprehensive treaty laying down the foundations for relations between the two countries.1 The treaty regulates political, economic, and cultural cooperation on a general level. More specific issues were addressed in two other documents: an agreement on Kaliningrad Oblast and a protocol on the establishment of representations in each republic's capital. Lithuania thus joined Latvia and Estonia in entering into official relations with the RSFSR, albeit six months later. The comparatively late signing can be attributed to two main factors. First, when Latvia and Estonia concluded their treaties with the RSFSR in January, Lithuania was faced with the more pressing problem of dealing with a violent round of USSR aggression. Second, some details of the treaty itself required extensive negotiation before a compromise could be reached, especially on the issue of citizenship. The Lithuanian parliament ratified the treaty unanimously on August 19, meeting in an emergency session following the coup in Moscow. In the meantime, Russians were building barricades outside the RSFSR parliament building, also bracing for an attack. As long as the outcome of the coup remains in doubt, so does the future of the Lithuania-RSFSR treaty. In the event that one or both signatories' parliaments should fall, the treaty will simply become part of the last will and testament of democratically elected governments striving for independence from the Kremlin. If, however, the coup were to fail and El'tsin filled the resulting power vacuum, elevating the RSFSR to the position of power broker in the Soviet Union, should such an entity continue to exist, the treaty might be seen as a document that had sucessfully anticipated the new order. Mutual Recognition Article 1 of the treaty proclaims that Lithuania and the RSFSR "recognize each other as subjects of international law with full rights and as sovereign states according to their state status established in fundamental acts." The respective "fundamental acts" are the redeclaration of Lithuanian independence of March 11, 1990, and the declaration of RSFSR sovereignty of June 12, 1990. Both countries commit themselves to refrain from using force against each other and agree not to interfere in each other's internal affairs. In a particularly significant section, the signatory states pledge to respect "territorial continuity and the inviolability of borders according to the principles of the Agreement on Security and Cooperation in Europe." This section clarifies the future of Kaliningrad Oblast, the only part of the RSFSR with a common border with Lithuania. An agreement accompanying the treaty formalizes the issue of RSFSR access to the area, but the inclusion of the border guarantee in Article 1 of the main treaty is important because, while the treaty is valid for ten years from the date of ratification, Article 1 will remain in force in perpetuity. The openly stated guarantee should help dispel rumors of Lithuanian pretensions to reclaim what is often considered ethnographically to be part of Lithuanian territory. Now that the status quo has been recognized, the real task of establishing a working relationship between Lithuania and Kaliningrad Oblast can begin. Compromise on Citizenship In another decision acknowledging the realities of the present situation, Lithuania and the RSFSR forged a compromise on the status of Russians in Lithuania. The Lithuanian citizenship law had been frequently cited by Russians and other minorities in Lithuania as excessively harsh. According to the law, passed on November 3, 1989, four conditions had to be met in order for immigrants (usually Russian) to qualify for citizenship: an applicant would have to demonstrate knowledge of the Lithuanian language, prove that he had been a resident of the republic for ten years, be gainfully employed or have another legal source of income in Lithuania, and show knowledge of the Lithuanian SSR constitution.2 The Lithuania-RSFSR treaty removes the language and residency requirements, allowing previously ineligible Russians to obtain citizenship. According to Article 4, people eligible for RSFSR citizenship, but living in Lithuania, have the right to obtain Lithuanian citizenship. The right to retain RSFSR citizenship in Lithuania, or vice versa, is also guaranteed. The treaty resolves a contentious issue, especially in its rescinding of the language requirement. Russian criticism of the citizenship law was not without justification. It is not difficult to understand why, when faced with the task of learning Lithuanian in a mere two years, some Russians would complain of human-rights violations. To reassure the respective minorities in both countries, the treaty specifically addresses human rights: each signatory "guarantees, without regard for nationality, civil, political, social, economic, and cultural rights according to generally recognized principles of international law." Ethnic, religious, and linguistic minorities have the right to "exercise their culture, practice their religion, and also to use their native language." Whether this commitment on paper will translate into practice remains to be seen, but the treaty does state the official line on minority issues, and it is to be assumed that in the future the signatories will be held responsible for their promises. Agreeing to Agree Many issues are not spelled out to the same degree as the citizenship and minority questions. Instead, Lithuania and the RSFSR commit themselves to future, more specific agreements. Article 12, for example, consists of a list of economic matters requiring regulation. It states that the two countries "will conclude special intergovernmental agreements on financial relations, banks, trade exchanges, the transfer of securities, payments, prices, customs, and transport tariffs." The treaty leaves room for additional cooperation with a disclaimer saying that "this list is not exhaustive." Although it may seem somewhat unproductive simply to enumerate possibilities for future cooperation, the significance lies in the brief addendum to the list in Article 12, which reads: "The agreements will establish mechanisms and deadlines for switching to trade at world prices." Given the current state of both the Lithuanian and Russian economies, such a plan might be dismissed as wishful thinking, but it indicates a solid commitment to economic reform on both sides. Test Case: Kaliningrad Article 11 of the treaty calls for a supplementary agreement concerning Kaliningrad Oblast. The agreement was ready for signing on the same day as the main treaty, and it deserves special attention as a prototype of similar agreements to follow. The document, signed by Lithuanian Prime Minister Gediminas Vagnorius and his RSFSR counterpart Ivan Silaev, acknowledges the RSFSR's "special interest" in the economic and cultural development of Kaliningrad Oblast. Previous arguments against Lithuanian independence would often include the complaint that the RSFSR would lose land access to Kaliningrad; the agreement attempts to allay such fears, presenting the RSFSR and Lithuania as partners working together for the good of Kaliningrad. Under the terms of the agreement, an arrangement that might be called the "Kaliningrad Corridor" is to be created, ensuring the free flow of people and goods between the RSFSR and the oblast. More supplementary agreements are to be concluded on this issue, but several main points are clear. Lithuania pledges not to disrupt the supply of natural gas from the RSFSR to Kaliningrad as it passes through a pipeline on Lithuanian territory. Electricity for Kaliningrad is to be provided by Lithuanian power plants, which will be supplied with the necessary fuels from the RSFSR. Transit shipments between the RSFSR and Kaliningrad through Lithuania are guaranteed, with the exception of military transports. A separate agreement will regulate shipment of hazardous materials. The agreement not only regulates transit between the RSFSR and Kaliningrad, but also assures Lithuanian access to the oblast. Lithuanian cargo is to travel duty free in transit through Kaliningrad, a guarantee that is bound to facilitate Lithuanian trade with the West in the future. Curiously, the duty-free transit for Lithuanian goods is extended to include "other RSFSR regions." Presumably, this would open ports such as Murmansk or Vladivostok to Lithuanian exports. Time will tell whether Lithuania can actually benefit from such a trade concession, but it is clear that both signatories are expressing their belief in free trade. In order to further economic relations between Kaliningrad Oblast and Lithuania, the agreement calls for the establishment of reciprocal "economic missions" in Vilnius and Kaliningrad. Other anticipated areas of cooperation include law enforcement, management of natural resources, and conservation. As the westernmost Russian outpost with an ice-free port, Kaliningrad is well placed as a gateway to the RSFSR. Recent developments indicate the potential for increased economic activity in the area. For example, a Soviet shipping company plans to establish a ferry link between Kaliningrad and either Bremen or Kiel.3 Although Kaliningrad is currently better known for its military installations, its economy may become more viable once the agreement comes into force. The Lithuanian recognition of its current border with Kaliningrad Oblast indicates Lithuanian interest in stability for the region, coupled with economic growth for the mutual benefit of Lithuania and the RSFSR. Quiet Diplomacy The Lithuanian and RSFSR delegations met to sign the treaty and its accompanying documents on July 29, the day before the more celebrated signing of the US-USSR START treaty. One observer wrote: "It was a historic summit, but neither Mikhail Gorbachev nor George Bush was invited."4 The Lithuania-RSFSR event contrasted sharply with the US-USSR meeting. While Bush and Gorbachev engaged in a "superpower summit" with the world looking on, Landsbergis and El'tsin quietly concluded an international agreement that illustrated the erosion of central power by the republics. According to the preamble of the treaty, Lithuania and the RSFSR are "convinced that, once the USSR eliminates the consequences of the annexation of 1940 that violated Lithuania's sovereignty, additional conditions will arise" allowing for greater "mutual trust" between Lithuania and the RSFSR. The treaty, then, anticipates a post-Soviet order and seeks to establish new relationships--Lithuania and the RSFSR hope to replace the former vertical ties between Moscow and Vilnius with horizontal ones. As for Lithuania itself, it would seem that its delegation made a number of concessions to the RSFSR during the negotiations. The revision of the citizenship law and the recognition of the current borders are the two most impressive compromises. The USSR often voices complaints about Lithuania's unwillingness to negotiate, but the Lithuania-RSFSR treaty would seem to suggest that these are unjustified. During the course of the negotiations, the Lithuanian leadership often came under criticism for dealing with the RSFSR instead of the Kremlin, since it was assumed that the USSR held the key to Lithuanian independence. The coup in Moscow, however, clearly forestalls any negotiations with the USSR. Estonia recognized this in its declaration of independence on August 20, which read: the coup "has rendered it impossible for the Republic of Estonia to reinstate state independence by way of mutual negotiations."5 If the RSFSR leadership emerges from the Soviet crisis intact and as a dominant power, its treaties with Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia may take on a much greater significance than is at present apparent. Gytis Liulevicius has a BA from Northwestern University in Slavic languages and literature and is currently a summer intern at RFE/RL. 1 For this and subsequent references to the treaty and the Kaliningrad agreement, see Lietuvos aidas, July 31, 1991. 2 Tiesa, November 10, 1989. The Lithuanian SSR ceased to exist after the reestablishment of the Republic of Lithuania on March 11, 1990. 3 DPA, August 13, 1991. 4 The Baltimore Sun, July 30, 1991. 5 Radio Tallinn, August 20, 1991.