USSR-- THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF COMMUNISTS OF RUSSIA Munich 20 August 1991 (RI/Dawn Mann) Summary: The convening of the founding conference of the Democratic Party of Communists of Russia in early August led to the expulsion from the CPSU of Aleksandr Rutskoi, the vice president of the RSFSR, and prompted the resignation of the RSFSR Communist Party first secretary, Ivan Polozkov. The severe reaction of the Russian Communist Party and CPSU leadership toward the formation of the DPKR was a further sign of rising conservative anger at the course of developments in the USSR. One event that surely added to the growing conservative frustration with the progress of affairs in the Soviet Union--a frustration that ultimately found expression in an illegal coup-- was the attempt by RSFSR Vice president Aleksandr Rutskoi to split the RSFSR Communist Party by forming a separate Communist party comprised of centrists and reformers within the Communist Party. Although events of the moment would appear to have brought Rutskoi's plans to an abrupt end, his efforts did help to bring about the resignation of the RSFSR CP's conservative first secretary, Ivan Polozkov. The founding conference of Rutskoi's new Communist party, the Democratic Party of Communists of Russia (DPKR), whose declared aim is to split the RSFSR Communist Party both organizationally and materially, was held on August 2-3, 1991. The conference was followed by a plenary session of the RSFSR Communist Party Central Committee on August 6, at which Rutskoi, the temporary chairman of the DPKR, was expelled from the CPSU. Two days later, Rutskoi's expulsion was seconded by the Party organization of the Soviet Air Force Main Political Administration (which, as the primary Party organization involved, could have overturned the RSFSR CC's decision and allowed Rutskoi to retain his Party membership).1 At the same plenum, Vladimir Lipitsky, the leader of the Democratic Movement of Communists (in the CPSU)--an intra- Party platform--and a co-organizer of the DPKR, was also expelled from the CPSU. Lipitsky, Rutskoi and Yurii Protasenko, a member of the DPKR organizing council, were also dropped from the RSFSR Central Committee. All three were accused of having violated the CPSU Party Rules (there are no separate RSFSR Communist Party Rules) by openly J engaging in an activity, i.e., the formation of the DPKR, aimed at splitting the RSFSR CP.2 The decision of the RSFSR CP Central Committee was in keeping with a pronouncement issued on August 3 by the CPSU Central Committee, which declared invalid the resolutions adopted at the DPKR's founding conference. The CPSU Central Committee supported its decision on the grounds that delegates to the conference had not been elected according to the Party Rules and non-Communists had also participated, in addition to which the DPKR had adopted a different name for itself and seemed to be claiming the role of "a party within the Party."3 Furthermore, the Party Rules, the Secretariat's statement continued, forbid parallel republican Communist parties and simultaneous membership in two political parties. As is his right, Rutskoi intended to appeal to the CPSU Central Committee--and to General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev as well.The DPKR council issued a statement on August 9 rejecting the RSFSR CP Central Committee and CPSU Secretariat charges.4 According to the DPKR's reading of the Party Rules, the DPKR founding conference was convened and held in accordance with the Party Rules, and cannot therefore be considered grounds for expelling DPKR members from the CPSU. Whether or not a case can be made for expelling Rutskoi and Lipitsky on the basis of how the DPKR organized its founding conference is probably immaterial, as it is abundantly clear that the formation of the DPKR and its aim certainly violate the spirit, if not the letter, of the Party Rules. The expulsion of Rutskoi and Lipitsky is in keeping with the approach adopted by the Party in the spring of 1990, when the Democratic and Marxist Platforms--the first internal Party factions to have been formed since the ban on factionalism was adopted in 1921--began to organize in preparation for a battle over the Party's draft program at the Twenty-eighth Party Congress. Following the release of an "open letter" from the CPSU Central Committee, which was intepreted by conservative Party organizations as a call for a purge, several supporters of the Democratic Platform were expelled from the CPSU.5 Since the Party Congress, however, the Party has taken a more lenient view of factionalism, in light of a change in the Party Rules permitting internal platforms and allowing Party members to participate in factions within other organizations. There have been very few expulsions, although the fact that so many Party members have resigned before they could be expelled has certainly played a role in keeping the number of expulsions low. It should also be borne in mind that the CPSU is not only divided into internal platforms, but that in the Baltic states and Moldavia, separate Communist parties have been formed, while the Georgian Communist Party has declared itself completely independent of the CPSU and the Armenian Communist Party is moving in the same direction. The CPSU's reaction to these developments has bordered on the fantastic. There has been absolutely no official reaction from the CPSU to the splitting of the Moldavian Communist Party, and the first secretaries of the Georgian and Armenian Communist parties have not been promoted to the ranks of the Politburo. The CPSU supports the conservative, Moscow-loyal, Communist parties in the Baltic states, but it has not taken any disciplinary action against those Communists belonging to the new Communist parties (although the first secretaries have not been included in the CPSU's leading bodies). Why did the CPSU Central Committee Secretariat and the RSFSR Communist Party Central Committee react so strongly to the formation of the DPKR? Rutskoi and Lipitsky have been punished for rule infractions that other Party members have gotten away with. (For example, no disciplinary action has been taken against the oranizers or supporters of the "Communist Initiative Movement" or the "Bolshevik Platform," although it appears that they have also violated the Party Rules with regard to the election of delegates to their founding sessions).6 Clearly the answer must be connected to the fact that the DPKR is a radical group in a conservative organization. Then, too, it is the Russian Communist Party that is most threatened by the DPKR. This threat is compounded by the fact that nowadays, given what is happening in the other republican Communist parties, the RSFSR CP and the CPSU are almost one and the same organization. There is also Rutskoi's position as the Russian Federation vice-president to consider. Rutskoi has been blessed by Boris El'tsin, and he enjoys the same sort of legitimacy that El'tsin possesses as the result of their election victory. Rutskoi is also a popular figure in his own right, and he appeals to a much broader segment of the Party than the leaders of the Democratic Platform (within the CPSU). The expulsion of Rutskoi and Lipitsky would seem to reflect badly on General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, who had been trying to present the CPSU as the party of reform. The expulsions as well as the CPSU Secretariat's statement could possibly have been a deliberate rebuke on the part of the conservatives. The RSFSR Central Committee plenum was held shortly after the CPSU Central Committee met to discuss the draft Party program, a document which conservatives are not at all happy with, but which was nonetheless released for discussion. Although the program was modified somewhat before its release, it still marks a sharp departure from Communist orthodoxy and is clearly one of Gorbachev's tactical weapons in his campaign to transform the CPSU. The RSFSR CC plenum was also held just days after El'tsin's decree on the "de-partification" of state institutions and enterprises came into force, which was furiously denounced by the conservatives and which led them to support Gorbachev, if only temporarily, in the hope that he would reverse the decree. By lashing out at the DPKR, the conservatives demonstrated their still considerable strength inside the Party and probably discouraged more Party moderates and reformers from thinking that they could work for change from within. No satisfactory answer as to why Gorbachev allowed the RSFSR Communist Party and the CPSU Secretariat to act in a manner contrary to his and the Party's best interests has appeared. In fact, Gorbachev's behavior with regard to all of the Party's various factions has been puzzling. If Gorbachev had given instructions that the DPKR was to be treated in the same fashion as the CPSU's other platforms or if he had stepped in and recognized the DPKR, he probably could have prevented the conservatives from expelling Rutskoi and Lipitsky. Similarly, Gorbachev missed an opportunity to take action against the Party's more reactionary wing by not disciplining the organizers of the "Bolshevik Platform" or the "Communist Initiative Movement." His failure to support the reformers openly and completely, combined with his failure to discipline the worst of the party's reactionaries, damaged the Party's and his own personal political standing. It could be that Gorbachev viewed the situation within the Party with equanimity. The first secretary of the Moscow city party committee, CPSU Politburo member Yurii Prokof'ev, thinks that it is impossible to establish any powerful political party without splitting the CPSU but that splitting the CPSU is impossible, given the existence of a large core of centrists. He therefore tends to dismiss the efforts of the DPKR and other political groups.7 Although Gorbachev has not gone so far as that, it is fairly clear that he--like Rutskoi--felt that a majority of the Party rank-and-file support reform and that reform of the Party is, therefore, possible.8 Aleksandr Yakovlev, whose left the CPSU on August 15, recently said that "[Gorbachev] continues to believe, unfortunately, that the Party can be reformed. I don't believe that now."9 But given the events of August 19, when the USSR State Committee for the State of Emergency took over, it would appear that Gorbachev did not act because he could not. After announcing his resignation from the Party, Yakovlev said that he thought that Gorbachev exercised only very limited control over the CPSU and that only such a lack of control could explain Gorbachev's failure to discipline the Party's reactionary members.10 The Origins of the DPKR On July 22, two weeks after the announcement of the formation of the Movement for Democratic Reforms (of which Rutskoi is a founding member, albeit a latecomer), the parliamentary faction "Communists for Democracy" announced plans to transform itself into a political party. The announcement came as something of a surprise. First of all, Rutskoi was on record as having said repeatedly that he did not want to split the Party. Second, in late June, Gorbachev and USSR Defense Council member (and unsuccessful RSFSR presidential candidate)Vadim Bakatin were reported to have met with Rutskoi to discuss whether a separate Communist Party should be formed and to have decided that it should not.11 Rutskoi is the founder and, until his election as vice president, was also the leader of the "Communists for Democracy" faction in the RSFSR Congress of People's Deputies and Supreme Soviet.12 The faction was formed during the third, extraordinary, session of the RSFSR Congress of People's Deputies in April, 1991, when it played a decisive role in helping El'tsin secure the approval of the Congress for the creation of a directly-elected executive presidency and the interim expansion of the powers of the Supreme Soviet chairman. Since then, "Communists for Democracy" factions have been formed in a number of soviets across the Russian republic. These factions quickly evolved into a political movement, also known as "Communists for Democracy," that unites Communist people's deputies in soviets at all levels.13 Rutskoi has said that he first got the idea of forming a deputies' group at the second, also extraordinary, session of the RSFSR Congress of People's Deputies in December, 1990, when the "Communists of Russia" parliamentary faction, to which some 200 Communist deputies belonged, voted against the Council of Ministers' economic reform program. Rutskoi said he decided to create a separate Communist faction because he could see that other Communist deputies were unhappy with the position adopted by the "Communists of Russia" faction, and because he thinks that the transformation of the CPSU into a parliamentary party can only be achieved by bringing together Communist deputies serving in different soviets.14 From the outset, he denied that the group had any plans to form a separate Communist Party, although it did plan to operate as a legally registered "socio-political organization." Asked in April whether he thought the group's activities would lead to a split in the Party, Rutskoi repeatedly said no, but by June he was willing to concede that a split could not be ruled out, and by July he was openly describing the DPKR as a party within the CPSU that would act in opposition to the Russian Communist Party and attempt to take over a share of its property.15 The August organizing conference was attended by more than 800 delegates representing all republics and regions of the RSFSR. Aleksandr Yakovlev, Eduard Shavardnadze, and Gavriil Popov also attended. There are plans to hold a founding congress in October; at the moment the party is concentrating on organizing members on a territorial basis. At the conference it was revealed that 7,230 applications for membership have already been received, which would put membership well over the 5,000 member threshold needed to register at the republic level.16 Rutskoi will head the temporary organizing committee but has said that because he is the RSFSR Vice President, he will not stand for election as DPKR leader. Rutskoi planned to meet with CPSU Central Committee members and Gorbachev to gain recognition of the DPKR as a separate party within the CPSU, but announced that the DPKR is ready to leave the CPSU if it is not recognized.17 The DPKR will join the Movement for Democratic Reforms (as will the parliamentary faction "Communists for Democracy").18 The declaration adopted by the delegates at the founding conference stated that the DPKR was created "because the reactionary policy of those who lead the Russian Communist Party is unacceptable to many Communists." It also states that the DPKR planned to operate within the CPSU as a "voluntary public and political association acting within the framework of Soviet and Russian laws by parliamentary methods, carrying out democratic reforms to advance the well-being, social security, rights and freedoms of Russian citizens, as well as promoting a social market economy, a civil society, and a law- governed state." The DPKR's program is short, consisting of just a couple of pages.19 It sets out the DPKR's position on socialism, perestroika, cadres, social protection, economic reform, political equality, primarily by critiquing the positions adopted by the RSFSR CP. The program begins by charging the CPSU with having built an "inhumane, economically ineffective, totalitarian, and socially antagonistic society," but the DPKR also announces its willingness to shoulder responsibility for "the catastrophic situation in the country now." The program considers perestroika's main achievement thus far to have been the dismantling of the official "mythology," but also submits that it is time for "a perestroika of perestroika"--that is, it is time for the initiative started from above to become a process carried out "from below," by ordinary people. Among the tasks and goals of the DPKR are the creation of a market economy while protecting invalids, children, and students; securing foreign investment; defending citizens against the "parasitism" of the bureaucracy; guaranteeing political and civil rights for all citizens; and removing Party cells from the judiciary, procuracy, KGB, army, and state apparatus. The DPKR's credo is "Not simply the formation of a market economy, but [pursuing] a democratic path to a civilized market; not simply a strong executive branch, but one united with a strong legislature; not a false plurality of opinion but the democractic development of parties and their competition." Lastly, the program's authors submit that in the future, the adjective "Communist" should be dropped from the party's name. Relations between the DPKR and the RSFSR Communist Party Rutskoi has made no secret of his contempt for the leaders and the bureaucrats of the RSFSR Communist Party. Although he was a member of the Russian Communist Party Bureau and a member of the RSFSR CP Central Committee, Rutskoi has said he never considered himself a member of the republican party. He has said repeatedly that the "hasty" creation of the Russian branch was a mistake, and has accused Party apparatchiks of adopting "an openly anti-democratic position and sabotaging new economic forms, political pluralism, and glasnost'."20 At the DPKR's founding conference he told the delegates that he wanted the DPKR "to cast aside the potentially criminal element of the Party and eject from its leading positions the obtuse, dull-witted, malicious, and cynical, for whom power is an instrument for humiliating others and promoting personal gain."21 For its part, the leadership of the RSFSR CP is less than enamoured of Rutskoi, the "Communists for Democracy" faction, and the DPKR. Ivan Polozkov, the former Russian Communist Party first secretary, refused an invitation to attend the DPKR founding conference,22 and his substitute, Ivan Antonovich, reportedly warned the delegates that they would all be expelled from the Party (as did a functionary attached to the CPSU Central Committee Secretariat).23 In reaction to what it considers to be Gorbachev's unsatisfactory attitude with regard to intra-Party factionalism and the lack of attention given to the issue at the July CPSU Central Committee plenum, the RSFSR CP Politburo and Central Control Commission presidium issued a statement on Party factions on July 26, prior to the founding conference of the DPKR.24 While noting that Party members are allowed to form platforms, the statement warned that Party members are not allowed to form factions, as these are disruptive to Party unity and hamper the achievement of Party aims. Although the statement made passing mention of the "Movement for Leninst and Communist Ideals--Edinstvo" and the "Initiative Congress of Communists of Russia," its focus of criticism was the "Communists for Democracy" movement. The statement charged the "Communists for Democracy" with openly planning to form a new party and claim some of the Communist Party's property, goals which Rutskoi had already announced. The movement, it continued, portrays the RSFSR CP as opposed to democracy and social progress, and at the same time, the movement acts as if its members have a monopoly on the democratic traditions of the Communist Party. The statement instructed Russian Communists to not give intra-Party groups a chance to form, and reminded them that the Party Rules require Party members to fight such attempts by expelling initiators from CPSU, if need be. Conclusion What will become of the Democratic Party of Communists of Russia is unknown. The first decree issued by the USSR State Committee for the State of Emergency on August 19 suspended the activities of all political parties, public organizations, and mass movements that "hinder the normalization of the situation."25 Repressive actions against DPKR and "Communists for Democracy" members, undertaken by either CPSU officials or representatives of the State Committee for the State of Emergency, cannot be ruled out. ---------- 1Sovetskaya Rossiya, August 9, 1991; TASS, August 9, 1991. 2The chairman of the RSFSR Communist Party Control Commission (which deals with disciplinary matters), Nikolai Stolyarov, is an open DPKR sympathizer: he joined the DPKR at the August conference (Sovetskaya Rossiya, August 8, 1991) and had been mentioned as a possible leader for the new party (Komsomolskaya pravda, August 8, 1991). As of now, however, no disciplinary action has been taken against him. 3TASS, August 3, 1991. 4TASS, August 9, 1991. 5See Dawn Mann, "Cracks in the CPSU Monolith," Report on the USSR, June 15, 1991, pp. 3-8. 6One of the charges brought against Rutskoi and Lipitsky was that delegates to the DPKR founding conference were not elected in accordance with the proceudre set out in the Party Rules for convening Party gatherings and that non-Party members participated. These same charges could be brought against the "Bolshevik Platform" and the "Communist Initiative Movement." 7TASS, August 9, 1991. 8See,for example, Rutskoi's comments in Literaturnaya gazeta, July 10, 1991. 9Sovetskaya Rossiya, August 3, 1991. 10Radio Rossii, August 16, 1991. 11Radio Rossii, June 27, 1991. 12A list of the members was published in Sovetskaya Rossiya, April 12, 1991. 13In May, Rutskoi set up another group, which he chairs, called "Civic Accord." Anyone can join "Civic Accord": Communists, people's deputies, members of other parties, or simply interested individuals, and the group is registered with the RSFSR Ministry of Justice. It is not a political party, but, as is the case with "Democratic Russia," political parties as institutions can belong to "Civic Accord." The DPKR will, of course, be a member of "Civic Accord." 14Izvestia, June 14, 1991. 15Novoe vremya, No. 15, 1991; Izvestia, June 14, 1991; TASS, July 19, 1991. 16Rutskoi and other members of the DPKR have predicted that as many as half the members of the RSFSR Communist Party, i.e., some three to four million people, will join the DPKR (Moscow News, No. 29, 1991). 17TASS, August 3, 1991. 18TASS, August 6, 1991; Novosti, July 22, 1991. Eduard Shevardnadze, ALeksandr Yakovlev and Gavriil Popov, all founding members of the Movement for Democratic Reforms, attended the founding conference of the DPKR. 19Novoe Vremya, No. 30, 1991. 20See, for example, his interview in Sobesednik, No. 31, 1991. 21 TASS, August 2, 1991. 22"Vesti," Russian Television, August 1, 1991. 23Radio Rossii, August 4, 1991. 24TASS, July 26, 1991. 25TASS, August 19, 1991.