USSR--CONSIDERING THE COUP: WHERE DO THE SOLDIERS STAND? Munich, August 20, 1991 (RI/Stephen Foye) News out of Moscow that some elite army units have defected to the side of RSFSR President Boris El'tsin and that a former senior General Staff officer has told soldiers to disobey orders is a reminder that Moscow's coup leaders enjoy, at best, only qualified support within the armed forces as a whole. More such defections will undoubtedly occur in the days ahead, but the ultimate extent of rebellion within the army, and its likely impact on the viability of the newly constituted authorities, can perhaps best be considered in terms of two related factors: that of geography, and that of time. Geographically, it would appear that the coup leadership can count most on those troops serving in the independence- seeking republics on the periphery. Because the Committee for the State of Emergency is unlikely to want to confront the well-armed and avowedly pugnacious population of Georgia, however, this means that repressive actions will be concentrated, as is already evident, in the Baltic republics. Here, as recent history has also indicated, the use of elite army, MVD, and KGB units against a small and largely unarmed population could be both brutal and highly effective. Defections will probably be limited and will not initially undermine repressive operations. Ultimately, however, the periphery is just that, and the coup leadership must control the great Russian heartland in order to maintain power. And it is here, precisely where the greatest number of reliable troops are needed, that the new regime is likely to face its greatest problems. Because of its size, the Russian republic cannot be brought to heel by KGB and MVD troops alone. Yet it is increasingly obvious that the current leadership cannot rely on the loyalty of regular army units, and that even elite units have become suspect. Film footage from CNN and other Western television reports has amply demonstrated that many Soviet soldiers--and not a few Soviet officers--would more happily mingle with the Russian population than shoot at it. Already a tank unit from the elite Taman Motor Rifle Division has crossed the barricades and gone over to El'tsin. AFP claims that units from the Ryazan Airborne Division, a battalion from the Sevastopol Military District, and an armored battalion have joined El'tsin as well, while Radio Liberty correspondents have reported defections from the Kantemirov and Dzerzhinsky divisions. The RSFSR Parliament building is reportedly now defended by some thirty tanks and Armored Personnel carriers. Soldiers have repeatedly expressed their unwillingness to fire on civilians. Of equal importance, such dissension is apparently not limited to the rank-and-file, and there is some evidence of opposition to the coup within the High Command itself. According to Western reports, Lieutenant General Konstantin Kobets declared to a crowd on August 19 that soldiers were not obliged to obey the orders of superior officers who support the new government. Currently chief of the RSFSR Defense Committee, Kobets was earlier a rising star within the Soviet General Staff and appears to have close ties with its chief, General Mikhail Moiseev. At the same time, the Russian Information Agency reported that a top-ranking officer from the Airborne Forces-- probably Major General Pavel Grachev--had been arrested on August 19 for supporting El'tsin. While a military spokesman later denied the charge, the confusion only enforced the appearance of disunity that had become increasingly evident even before the launching of the coup. The ability of the current leadership to retain the loyalty of the troops would also appear to depend on a time factor. Because the coup was clearly poorly planned and enjoys only limited support even among the Soviet elite--not to mention the armed forces--it will undoubtedly fail to smother opposition to the extent that the imposition of martial law did in Poland in 1981. In fact, the coup leadership's greatest hope probably lay in a rapid and brutal assertion of power--more on the lines of Tiananmen Square. Such an approach would have placed primary responsibility for repression on the more reliable security forces, and might have, in the short term at least, forced a dazed population into submission. It would have left little time for disaffected soldiers to defect and, if thoroughly conducted, might have left them no opposition to rally around. But the men occupying the Kremlin appear to be a mediocre lot. Unable to lead through charisma or the force of their ideas, they appear also to have lacked the stomach for the type of brutal seizure of power that was their greatest hope. And their ability--or inability--to hold the loyalty of the troops is very likely to parallel their chances of cowing the population as a whole. While the Committee For the State of Emergency is probably only a front for men who might be far more willing to use violence, every hour of temporizing appears likely to strengthen democratic forces and to erode the very instruments of coercion upon which their success must ultimately be based. In the long-run, a military-backed dictatorship could not solve the Soviet Union's political and economic problems. By its current policies, the coup leaders also appears to be frittering away their chances for short term success.