RL 322/91 August 29, 1991 KRAVCHUK AND THE COUP Roman Solchanyk The indecisive public reaction of Chairman of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet Leonid Kravchuk during the first few days of the failed coup has opened him to criticism from representatives of the democratic opposition. Following Ukraine's declaration of independence on August 24, however, the Ukrainian leader can be expected to take an even firmer line on the question of full independence. The key to Kravchuk's political future lies in the way relations develop between Ukraine and Russia. The attempted coup d'etat of August 18-19, which appears to have been primarily if not exclusively aimed at preventing the territorial disintegration of the Soviet Union, has achieved the exact opposite. On August 24, as a direct consequence of the failed coup, the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet adopted a declaration of independence. Ukraine's move followed on the heels of declarations of independence by Latvia and Estonia, and Belorussia and Moldavia quickly followed suit. Ukrainian independence and the banning of the Communist Party of Ukraine, which had been the main force in the republic acting to preserve the Soviet Union as "a renewed federation," have dramatically and quite suddenly transformed the political situation in Ukraine. The balance of power has shifted in favor of the democratic opposition, which, though divided over tactics, has been united on the fundamental question of state independence. The Communist Party has been disgraced as an institution, and some of its leaders are likely to face criminal charges for promoting the failed coup in the republic. Among the many issues over which question marks still hang is the eventual fate of Leonid Kravchuk, chairman of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet, who has cautiously steered a middle course between the democratic opposition and the Communist-backed majority in parliament, and who, certainly prior to the coup attempt, was the leading candidate in the republican presidential elections scheduled for December 1.1 Questions about Kravchuk's political future have been raised in connection with his initial response to the developments in Moscow. His first public statement, broadcast on republican television and radio at 1600 on August 19, neither supported nor condemned the coup. The Ukrainian leader called on citizens to remain "calm and patient," saying that the Supreme Soviet had thus far not received any official documents from Moscow and that, in due course, an evaluation of the situation would be made by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and the Supreme Soviet itself. With regard to such extraordinarily serious political matters, he maintained, one should not be "in a hurry with appraisals," which, in any case, should be undertaken by "the collective organ elected by the people."2 At the same time, he added, there could be no doubt that in a law-based state everything, including the introduction of a state of emergency, must be done on the basis of the law. Kravchuk noted that a state of emergency had not been introduced in Ukraine and emphasized that all legally elected state organs were functioning throughout the republic. It was only towards the end of his address that Kravchuk hinted at the illegality of the coup. Appealing for unity "in the name of democracy," Kravchuk said: It is precisely our unity that will guarantee the failure of attempts by anyone and of any kind to act outside the Constitution, to return society to the kinds of ruling or other structures, both in the center and locally, that could stand above the law. Much more compromising was Kravchuk's appearance that evening on Central Television's main news program "Vremya," where he said: "what has happened was bound to happen" (to chto proizoshlo ono dolzhno bylo proizoiti), adding that perhaps it could have taken other forms.3 The main problem, he argued, was that the center was incapable of governing. Later, at a press conference for foreign journalists on August 22, Kravchuk explained that the broadcast had been heavily censored to remove any criticism of the coup leaders. He also revealed that Boris El'tsin had called him on the morning of August 19 and that he had told the Russian president: "I will never recognize this committee [the State Committee for the State of Emergency in the USSR] and El'tsin thanked me for this."4 Western journalists later reported that El'tsin had indeed stated that Kravchuk and Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbaev had backed his strike call, although a joint statement by the leaders of the three largest republics, which had been expected, never materialized.5 Kravchuk was afforded another opportunity to publicly air his views on developments in an interview with correspondents for republican television and radio on the evening of August 20, directly after the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet adopted a declaration on the situation. In the course of the interview, he repeated his argument from the previous evening--that the center could not handle the situation but that it nonetheless did not want to hand over power to the republics. At the same time, he suggested that the announcement by the coup leaders of Gorbachev's illness was unconvincing and that he would demand full information on the status of the Soviet president's health. Then, in what could be interpreted as a statement recognizing the Emergency Committee, Kravchuk said: I feel that the committee that has just been formed has already made quite a few mistakes. Well, that's normal, because it is a new formation; it has not found itself yet. But can this be corrected? I think that it can and that this should be done by an extraordinary session of the [USSR] Supreme Soviet, which, as has been announced, will convene on August 26.6 In the next breath, Kravchuk told the correspondents that, to the extent that it was possible, he would press for Gorbachev to be invited to the Supreme Soviet session in Moscow. If health reasons did not permit him to attend, then a statement from the Soviet president should be read at the session. Further, he expressed puzzlement about why the Emergency Committee had been formed if, as the coup leaders had said at their press conference, Gorbachev would eventually return to his post. Kravchuk emphasized that these were his personal views. Once again, the Ukrainian leader did not take a clear-cut stand. Conspicuous by its absence, moreover, was any indication of support for the position taken by El'tsin. Shortly before Kravchuk's interview, the Presidium of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet, which was called into session at 1800 on August 19, had adopted a declaration on the situation containing the following main points: (1) a full analysis and appraisal of the situation in the aftermath of the formation of the Emergency Committee would be made by the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet following decisions taken by the extraordinary session of the USSR Supreme Soviet scheduled for August 26; (2) prior to a decision taken by the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet, the resolutions of the Emergency Committee would have no juridical foundation on the territory of Ukraine; (3) a state of emergency had not been introduced in the republic and the Presidium saw no justification for its introduction; (4) t`e!Constitutions of the USSR and the Ukrainian SSR and the appropriate laws and resolutions remained in force and the legally elected organs of state rule and administration were continuing to exercise their duties; and (5) the Presidium intended to consistently defend the state sovereignty of Ukraine, human rights, and the democratic achievements initiated in 1985. In addition, the declaration called on local councils of people's deputies, heads of state organs, enterprises, and organizations, leaders of political parties, public groups, and mass movements, and citizens of the republic to do everything in their power to prevent a destabilization of the situation and to refrain from holding strikes, meetings, and demonstrations.7 The declaration, which was supported by fifteen of the twenty-five members of the Presidium who were present, including Kravchuk, was later criticized by the democratic opposition both for its tardiness and for its failure to adopt a decisive stance.8 The main stumbling block was the second point in the declaration, which, in essence, declared the Emergency Committee's decision null and void on the territory of Ukraine.9 The leader of the parliamentary opposition Narodna Rada, Ihor Yukhnovs'kyi, addressing the extraordinary session of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet convened on August 24, accused Kravchuk of failing to take a stand during the Presidium session. Yukhnovs'kyi said that Kravchuk had banned discussion and even the reading of a telegram in support of the RSFSR leadership at the Presidium session, and he suggested that the Ukrainian leader had struck a deal with Army General Valentin Varennikov, commander in chief of Soviet Ground Forces, with whom he had met in his office at the Supreme Soviet on the morning of August 19 together with General Viktor Chechevatov, commander of the Kiev Military District and another general named Sharikov.10 Kravchuk, who addressed the Ukrainian parliament before Yukhnovs'kyi, claimed that he had emphasized from the very start of the Presidium session that he would never recognize the legality of the Emergency Committee. At the same time, he agreed that the declaration was late in coming and that, from the present vantage point, it was indeed "soft." As for his meeting with Varennikov, Kravchuk informed the Ukrainian deputies that the general had "unceremoniously" warned him that any acts of civil disobedience or attempts to ignore the decisions of the Emergency Committee would result in the introduction of a state of emergency. Specifically, Varennikov told Kravchuk: Power has has been assumed by the Emergency Committee, which will save the country. I suggest that you think about this and take the correct position. Change your course: the course of the Supreme Soviet and your own, do not encourage the deputies to all kinds of talk [in the Supreme Soviet]. The army has its orders and will act. Should the army have information that the situation requires the introduction of a state of emergency, it will be done. Think about it, maybe a state of emergency should be introduced in the western oblasts and in Kiev.11 "So we had to act responsively," said Kravchuk. "Manifesting concern for the fate of the people, who at any moment could have been drawn into a catastrophe by the ill will of the insurrectionists." He also said he had told Varennikov that the Emergency Committee was an unconstitutional body that could not be recognized until the session of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet, and he added that this could be verified by First Deputy Prime Minister Kostyantyn Masyk, who was present during the discussion.12 Earlier, at the press conference on August 22, Kravchuk told foreign journalists: "I understood from him [Varennikov] that I was on the blacklist after El'tsin--the Baltics, El'tsin and then me."13 Both at the press conference and during the extraordinary session of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet, Kravchuk defended himself against accusations of wavering with the argument that, as chairman of the Supreme Soviet, he was, unlike El'tsin, not empowered to issue decrees but only to sign decisions of the Presidium.14 Consequently, at the Supreme Soviet session he asked for special powers until the election of a president. These powers were granted.15 For Kravchuk, the turnaround came on August 21 in yet another evening interview for republican radio and television, in which he finally came out unequivocally against what he now referred to as "the so-called Emergency Committee."16 "I consider that it no longer exists," he said, "and actually it never existed. This was a deviation from the democratic process, from the constitutional and legal process." In the course of the interview, Kravchuk noted that he was the first of the republican leaders to get in touch with Gorbachev in the Crimea. He also revealed that earlier in the day he had telephoned Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Anatolii Luk'yanov and delivered what amounted to an ultimatum. The Ukrainian leader is reported to have told Luk'yanov that: (1) he personally did not and never would recognize the Emergency Committee; (2) the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet would shortly convene an extraordinary session, which, he was confident, would not recognize the Emergency Committee's legitimacy either; (3) the USSR Supreme Soviet could not be convened in the absence of Gorbachev; and (4) an appeal to the citizens of Ukraine not to heed any orders from the Emergency Committee would be issued immediately.17 In a separate message to Luk'yanov, also issued on August 21, Kravchuk again demanded Gorbachev's presence at the USSR Supreme Soviet.18 After August 21, the steps taken by the would-be Ukrainian president were fairly predictable. On August 24, Kravchuk told the extraordinary session of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet that he had decided to resign from the CPSU Central Committee and from the Politburo and Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine.19 Several days later, at a press conference on August 27, he said that he had handed in his resignation from the Party on August 19, the first day of the attempted coup.20 Clearly, Kravchuk's behavior during the dramatic days of August 19-21 throws up a number of contradictions and leaves many questions unanswered. Yet, there is little doubt that, overall, the Ukrainian leader hesitated to take a decisive stand against the plotters in Moscow. Further, there are indications that, even when he acted more resolutely, he did so as a result of pressure from the democratic forces. Thus, according to one report, the "threatening" telephone call to Luk'yanov on August 21 followed a call at 3:00 A.M. to Kravchuk from representatives of the Narodna Rada demanding that he contact Moscow and unequivocally denounce the Emergency Committee.21 Similarly, the convening of the Supreme Soviet on August 24 appears to have been the work of the Narodna Rada, which gathered the necessary 150 signatures required for an extraordinary session of the parliament.22 Kravchuk, it will be recalled, favored holding the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet session after the USSR Supreme Soviet convened on August 26, a position that was reflected in the declaration of the Presidium of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet on August 20.23 In sum, it is difficult to disagree with the claim of Elt'sin's deputy Ruslan Khasbulatov that it was the opposition Narodna Rada, which took an uncompromising stand against the coup plotters from the very start, that saved Ukraine's honor.24 The impact of all of this on Kravchuk's political career is equally unclear. At the extraordinary session of the Supreme Soviet, opposition deputies called for an inquiry into Kravchuk's behavior during the attempted coup. Earlier, a "Rukh" spokesman demanded that the postcoup "cleanup" in Ukraine begin with Kravchuk himself.25 Similar demands could be heard in the streets of Kiev. Vladimir Grinev, deputy chairman of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet, who was one of the first Ukrainian leaders to denounce the attempted coup in an interview in Komsomol'skoe znamya published on August 20, has said that Kravchuk has lost "authority and popularity."26 But whether this will seriously effect the outcome of the presidential vote on December 1 remains questionable. Moreover, in the weeks and months to come, it can be expected that Kravchuk will take an even harder line on Ukrainian independence, which is sure to be greeted favorably by the electorate. That process has already begun. At a press conference on August 27, the Ukrainian leader said that, in his opinion, there "cannot be any work on the Union treaty until December 1"--that is, until after the referendum on Ukraine's independence.27 The determining factor, however, may prove to be neither his behavior on August 19-21 nor his enthusiasm for Ukrainian independence but rather the practical outcome of the newly emerging relationship between Ukraine and Russia. 1 For an analysis of Kravchuk's politics, see Roman Solchanyk, "The Changing Political Landscape in Ukraine," Report on the USSR, No. 24, 1991, pp. 20-23. 2 The address was published in Radyans'ka Ukraina, August 20, 1991. 3 Central Television, "Vremya," August 19, 1991. 4 Reuters, August 22, 1991; The Guardian, August 23, 1991; Molod' Ukrainy, August 24, 1991. An abridged transcript of the press conference was published in Radyans'ka Ukraina, August 24, 1991. 5 AFP, August 20, 1991; The Independent, August 21, 1991. 6 Radio Kiev, August 20, 1991. The statement about the Emergency Committee not having "found itself yet" does not appear in the published version of the interview (see Radyans'ka Ukraina and Robitnycha hazeta, August 22, 1991). 7 For the text, see Radyans'ka Ukraina, August 22, 1991. 8 Reuters, August 20, 1991; The Ukrainian Weekly, August 25, 1991. 9 Molod' Ukrainy, August 24, 1991. See also Izvestia (Moscow evening edition), August 21, 1991. 10 Radio Kiev and Interfax, in English, August 24, 1991; Komosomol'skoe znamya, August 27, 1991. The theory that Kravchuk reached a compromise with "the local military commander" was also advanced by The Economist, August 24, 1991, p. 18. 11 Molod' Ukrainy, August 27, 1991. 12 Radio Kiev, August 24, 1991, Komsomol'skoe znamya, August 27, 1991. According to The Independent, August 20, 1991, the meeting with Varennikov was also attended by Ukrainian opposition leaders. 13 The Independent, August 23, 1991; Molod' Ukrainy, August 24, 1991. 14 Radio Kiev, August 23, 1991; The Independent, August 23, 1991; The Los Angeles Times, August 25, 1991; The Ukrainian Weekly, August 25, 1991. 15 Interfax, in English, August 24, 1991; Radio Kiev, August 26, 1991. For the text of the law giving Kravchuk additional powers, see Literaturna Ukraina, August 29, 1991. 16 Radio Kiev, August 21, 1991. 17 Message from Deputy Chairman of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet Vladimir Grinev, courtesy of Dr. Bohdan Hawrylyshyn, cochairman of the Council of Advisers to the Presidium of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet. For a report on the conversation between Kravchuk and Luk'yanov, see also Molod' Ukrainy, August 22, 1991. 18 For the text, see Sil's'ki visti, August 22, 1991. 19 Ukrinform-TASS, August 24, 1991. 20 Radio Kiev, August 27, 1991. See also Izvestia (Moscow evening edition), August 28, 1991. 21 The Independent, August 22, 1991. 22 Radio Kiev, August 22, 1991. Molod' Ukrainy, August 22, 1991, wrote that the signatures were collected "at the request" of Kravchuk. 23 Radio Kiev, August 24, 1991. 24 Molod' Ukrainy, August 27, 1991. 25 AFP, August 24, 1991, quoting Interfax; The Guardian, August 23, 1991. 26 The Independent, August 22, 1991. 27 Radio Kiev, August 27, 1991.