RL 321/91 August 29, 1991 CENTRAL ASIA: MIXED REACTIONS Bess Brown The reactions of the leaders of the Central Asian republics to the attempted coup in Moscow were in accord with their political orientations. The conservative presidents of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan either gave cautious approval or waited to see what would happen next. President Nazarbaev of Kazakhstan rejected the coup, as did Askar Akaev of Kyrgyzstan, who was himself the target of an abortive coup. During the first and only press conference of the State Committee for the State of Emergency in the USSR on the evening of August 19, junta chief Gennadii Yanaev cited Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan as examples of regions in which there was no need to declare a state of emergency. The junta apparently believed that President Nursultan Nazarbaev of Kazakhstan, President Islam Karimov of Uzbekistan, and the leaders of the other Central Asian republics would sympathize with the Emergency Committee's objectives despite its opposition to the new Union treaty. Yet the committee's antagonism to the treaty, which Nazarbaev and Karimov were to have signed on August 20, must have warned Central Asian leaders that the junta would be unlikely to respect the sovereignty of their republics. Nazarbaev showed in his angry attack on the junta on August 20 that he was well aware of its intention of undermining the declarations of sovereignty adopted by the republics in the last two years. Although the committee's promise to restore order in Soviet society may have appealed to more conservative Central Asian leaders such as President Niyazov of Turkmenistan, none gave it his direct support. The reactions of Central Asian leaders to the coup differed according to their political orientations. The presidents of Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan, all of whom have attempted to limit or suppress democratic forces in their republics, either indicated cautious acceptance of the coup or said nothing. The more liberal leaders of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan rejected it. Kazakhstan Although the junta considered it necessary to attempt to gain the support of Nursultan Nazarbaev as the leader of one of the most important republics, they cannot have considered him a desirable collaborator. He is known to be a proponent of even more devolution of power to the republics than is granted in the version of the Union treaty that he was to have signed on August 20. Although he has argued that the Communist Party is the only political group with the organization and experience to carry out major economic reforms, Nazarbaev has been part of the progressive wing of the CPSU, describing himself as a moderate in politics and a radical on economic issues. Even more problematic from the point of view of the Emergency Committee, Nazarbaev has worked closely with Boris El'tsin to try to maximize republican rights under the new Union treaty. Although Nazarbaev accused El'tsin of political immaturity when the Russian president called for Gorbachev's resignation last year, the two republican leaders seem to have worked well together to advance common interests. Nazarbaev's first public response to the coup was to try to forestall possible disturbances that could have been used as a pretext for declaring a state of emergency in Kazakhstan. In an appeal to the population issued on August 19, Nazarbaev warned against hasty actions that could lead to serious social upheaval.1 The following day, "Azat," the largest non-Communist political movement in Kazakhstan, issued its own appeal for calm, warning that unrest could provide the pretext for a repetition of the events of December, 1986, in Alma-Ata.2 Demographic realities in Kazakhstan, with the Kazakh and Russian shares of the population roughly equal, mean that the republic's apparent stability is fragile. Republican leaders assiduously try to prevent frictions that could lead to interethnic strife, which could in turn threaten Kazakhstan's territorial integrity if the northern oblasts with their largely non-Kazakh populations attempted to secede. Although Yanaev may have offered Nazarbaev a promise of no state of emergency in exchange for the Kazakh leader's support, Nazarbaev was certainly well aware that antinuclear activists were on their way to Semipalatinsk, intending to prevent by whatever means necessary the nuclear weapon test scheduled for August 29. Their action, which has wide support in Kazakhstan, would undoubtedly lead to a confrontation between demonstrators and the army, which at that point appeared to be one of the mainstays of the junta. The potential for violence, which could have had serious repercussions, must have appeared very great on August 19, and this may explain why Nazarbaev did not condemn the Moscow coup at once. He did, in effect, reject the junta in his appeal on August 19 by reminding the army, KGB, and USSR MVD units stationed in the republic that they were obligated to respect the constitution and by promising that no state of emergency would be introduced in Kazakhstan by outside forces. By the following day, Nazarbaev had decided to defy the junta in stronger language. He issued a statement denouncing the illegality of the Emergency Committee and describing the coup as a betrayal of efforts to create a state based on law.3 He acknowledged that he had been impatient with Gorbachev's unwillingness to intervene decisively to end the economic crisis in the country but made it clear that he had wanted Gorbachev to take more radical steps to deal with the crisis, not reverse the reform process as demanded by the hard-liners. Nazarbaev subsequently related how, when Gorbachev phoned him from the Crimea on August 21 and told him that members of the junta were trying to see him, he had told Gorbachev not to meet with them but to wait for "our people"--the group from the RSFSR Supreme Soviet. At this point, Nazarbaev clearly saw himself as a part of El'tsin's resistance team. By August 22, Nazarbaev had decided that the CPSU could never be the force for reform that he had believed it to be. He announced his resignation from both the Politburo and the CPSU Central Committee, citing his disgust at the stream of documents supporting the junta that he had received on August 19 and 20 from the CPSU Secretariat. One of the missives called on Party members in Kazakhstan to cooperate with the Emergency Committee; another asked Nazarbaev in his capacity as a member of the Politburo to sign a draft declaration of the CPSU Central Committee justifying the actions of the junta. Not only did Nazarbaev refuse, he announced his intention of having the Communist Party of Kazakhstan break with the CPSU and establish itself as an independent party.4 Although Nazarbaev joined the rush to eject Party organizations from law-enforcement bodies and issued a depoliticization decree on August 22, he clearly wants to retain the republican Party's administrative skills to further his economic reform program. Kyrgyzstan One of the more astonishing stories to emerge as the junta disintegrated was the claim by Radio Rossii on August 21 that members of the Emergency Committee had fled to Kyrgyzstan. As the Central Asian republic where democratization is furthest advanced, Kyrgyzstan was the least likely place for the authors of a reactionary putsch to seek asylum, particularly in view of what had just occurred there. While the coup was being carried out in Moscow during the night of August 18-19, a smaller version was being attempted in Bishkek.5 Conservative forces in Kyrgyzstan, centered primarily in the republican Communist Party organization, had been trying to undermine liberal republican President Askar Akaev since his surprise election last winter. The coup in Moscow offered them an excellent opportunity to rid themselves of Akaev and his democratization program. Immediately after Yanaev's announcement of the coup in the early morning of August 19, the commander of the Turkestan Military District phoned Akaev, telling him that tanks and troops would be sent into the republic if Akaev did not dismiss his guards. The republican Communist Party buro then prepared a declaration of loyalty to the Emergency Committee. Akaev's reaction was swift and effective: he dismissed KGB chairman Dzhumabek Asankulov, who, if not an active participant in the plot, had at least not informed Akaev of what was afoot, and entrusted Asankulov's duties to his vice president, German Kuznetsov, a supporter of the Movement for Democratic Reforms. At the same time, Minister of Internal Affairs Feliks Kulov, another liberal reformer, sent local MVD units to barricade the entrances to the Central Committee building, the telegraph office, and the radio and television center. Akaev then issued an appeal to the people of Kyrgyzstan, calling for the triumph of reason and democracy and stating that republican authorities would act only in accord with the constitution. The Kirgiz Democratic Movement, Kyrgyzstan's largest political organization opposing the Communists, sent a telegram of support to Boris El'tsin immediately after Yanaev's announcement was broadcast.6 Akaev later said that USSR KGB Chairman Vladimir Kryuchkov had phoned him on the evening of August 19 to protest against the firing of Asankulov and gave Akaev the choice of reinstating Asankulov or waiting ten days before taking action. If Kryuchkov was aware of the plans for a minicoup in Kyrgyzstan, he presumably thought that in ten days time Akaev, rather than Asankulov, would be gone. Akaev replied stoutly: "We can't wait ten minutes." He then established contact with Boris El'tsin's headquarters and sent personal representatives to the leaders of Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Belorussia, but he was unable to organize a united front of resistance to the junta. In response to the junta's instructions on the first day, Akaev ordered that El'tsin's appeal be broadcast every two hours on republican television and ordered that it be printed in the republican newspapers. On August 20, he appeared on television himself to denounce the coup as a "military and Party putsch." While the defenders of the Russian parliament building were battling tanks, Akaev was contacting the United Nations and the Japanese embassy in Moscow to ask for assistance should the republic become the target of military intervention. Also on the night of August 20, Akaev signed a sweeping depoliticization decree, prohibiting any kind of party political organization in state agencies, joint publications of political parties and government bodies, the holding of political meetings in working time, and the use by political parties of buildings belonging to the state. Most painful of all, the decree forbids political parties to collect dues. Depoliticization had already begun in Kyrgyzstan a few weeks earlier when the Communist Party organization in the MVD dissolved itself, to be followed by that in the Ministry of Justice. For republican Communist Party officials, the beginning of depoliticization was probably what made them decide to attempt to overthrow Akaev. Having seen the outcome of the junta's attempt to storm the "White House" in Moscow, Akaev issued a decree on the morning of August 21 forbidding all military units stationed in the republic to leave their barracks without his permission. During a meeting that same day with the Kirgiz delegation to the USSR Supreme Soviet, he said that he had also ordered the commander of the Bishkek garrison to end all ties with political parties and instructed the commander of the Turkestan Military District to recall helicopters and aircraft that were flying over Bishkek. Akaev was not yet finished with the Communist Party of Kyrgyzstan. He refused to meet with its first secretary, Dzhumgalbek Amanbaev, and, on August 23, confiscated the Central Committee building and the Lenin Museum in Bishkek.7 The Communist Party leadership refused to appear at a rally on August 23, organized by the Democratic Kyrgyzstan Movement and attended by Vice President Kuznetsov, to celebrate the end of the coup, and it was apparent that it was only a matter of time before the completely discredited Party organization collapsed. The state prosecutor's office launched an investigation of the Party leadership, and on August 26 an announcement appeared stating that the entire buro and secretariat of the Party had resigned.8 That same day, republican dailies carried Akaev's and Kuznetsov's resignations from the CPSU. So far, Kyrgyzstan has been the biggest beneficiary in Central Asia of the events set in motion by the coup in Moscow. With the power of the republican Communist Party broken, it remains to be seen whether the most influential political party in the republic will be the largely Kirgiz "Democratic Kyrgyzstan" or the newly formed multiethnic "National Unity" group, of which Kuznetsov is a founder. Uzbekistan Although some aspects of the junta's program may have appealed to Uzbekistan's conservative president and Communist Party leader, Islam Karimov, he never publicly supported the Emergency Committee. The nearest Karimov came to compromising himself was to complain about the process of reform in the Soviet Union to a meeting of Communist Party and government leaders held in Tashkent on August 19, comparing the implementation of perestroika to tearing down one's house before a new one is built and claiming that, without order, democracy can bring no good.9 He also criticized opposition forces, for which he has shown little tolerance, accusing them of using democracy and glasnost' as a cover for a seizure of power. He apparently did not say that he supported the junta. The authorities in Uzbekistan seem to have been fearful that the hard-liners in Moscow would try to undermine the sovereignty of the republics, and on August 20 a joint statement by the presidium of the republican Supreme Soviet and the Cabinet of Ministers reaffirmed Uzbekistan's commitment to the principles embodied in its declaration of sovereignty in June, 1990.10 A correspondent of The Washington Post on special assignment in Tashkent found that people on the streets were critical of the coup, but there was no sign of overt resistance.11 An Uzbek deputy, in an attempt to explain Karimov's actions, reminded the USSR Supreme Soviet on August 26 that the Uzbek president had just returned from India and the coup had come as a shock to him.12 It seems more likely that Karimov wanted to see what was going to happen before committing himself. Whatever his motivation, he did not publicly defy the junta until August 21, when it was already evident that the coup was failing. In a decree issued that day, Karimov declared that all governmental decisions taken on the territory of Uzbekistan would have to be in accordance with the constitutions of the republic and the USSR, and that the orders of the junta were invalid.13 Presumably as a measure to prevent disturbances that could have been used to justify declaring a state of emergency, the authorities in Tashkent were reported to have ordered the detention of opposition leaders, including Abdurrakhim Pulatov, a cochairman of the Uzbek Popular Front, "Birlik," on August 19.14 Most of them were released within a day, but the action underscores the republican leadership's mistrust of those political organizations it does not control. The overwhelming role played by the RSFSR in foiling the coup and the resulting self-congratulatory mood of the Russian democrats seem to have caused the Uzbek leadership even greater fears for the republic's sovereignty than had the statements of the junta. Karimov apparently saw the triumph of the Russian democrats and the discrediting of the CPSU as an acute danger to his own party's control of the republic, and he started taking steps to limit the damage, resigning from the CPSU Politburo on August 23, ostensibly because the leadership of the CPSU Central Committee and Secretariat had been so "cowardly and unprincipled" during the coup.15 By the end of the week, Karimov was taking measures that were described as strengthening the republic's sovereignty.16 These included asserting control over all MVD and KGB bodies within Uzbekistan, including USSR MVD troops stationed there. He also instructed the presidium of the republican Supreme Soviet to draft a law declaring Uzbekistan's independence. The opposition "Erk" Democratic Party also called for republican independence, but it is unlikely that the group's appeal had much effect on Karimov, beyond perhaps indicating to him that such a declaration would have the backing of influential intellectuals.17 Turkmenistan On August 27, Turkmen deputy Maral Amanova attempted to explain to the USSR Supreme Soviet why the Turkmen leadership had reacted so belatedly to the coup in Moscow.18 Information was slow in reaching Ashkhabad after the initial anouncement of the junta, said Amanova, so nothing was done. News of El'tsin's defiance reached Turkmenistan only on the evening of August 20. On the morning of August 21, the republican leadership refused to disseminate the junta's directives. In any case, not one of the junta's orders was carried out in Turkmenistan, according to Amanova. She neglected to mention, however, that the republican press had published the junta's appeal on August 20. It seems most likely that the very conservative leadership in Turkmenistan preferred to wait and see what would happen in Moscow before committing itself to supporting or condemning the coup, and in the end decided to say nothing. Neither President Saparmurad Niyazov nor the presidium of the republican Supreme Soviet made any public statement either for or against the coup, although Niyazov told a meeting of the republican Council of Elders on the afternoon of August 19 that the USSR was sliding into chaos and order needed to be restored.19 On August 22, when the junta had collapsed, Niyazov issued a decree rescinding all its orders, which he had apparently ignored anyway.20 Opposition groups in Turkmenistan, the small Popular Front group "Agzybirlik" and the Democratic Party, condemned the coup and criticized Niyazov's failure to speak out, although it is unlikely that their protests were heard by a very wide public. A newly formed coalition of democratic groups met in Ashkhabad to draw up a joint declaration condemning the coup, to which Niyazov responded by having some members of the opposition arrested.21 There is little sign that his antagonism to Turkmenistan's aspiring democrats has moderated in any way. Tajikistan On August 19, the day the coup was announced, President Kakhar Makhkamov of Tajikistan told the head of the Tajik Journalists' Union that he supported the junta in principle. Makhkamov explained his response, according to the USSR Supreme Soviet deputy who quoted the exchange, by citing what he claimed was a promise by the junta to promote democratization and republican sovereignty.22 The deputy, Davlatnazar Khudonazarov, progressive head of the USSR Union of Cinema Workers, added that the Party first secretary in Gissar Raion, near Dushanbe, had reacted to the news of the coup by warning that censorship was to be reinstated. Makhkamov, who almost lost his post as Tajik Party first secretary as a result of riots and demonstrations in Dushanbe in February, 1990, shows little tolerance of opposition forces in the republic, whether of an Islamic or Western democratic orientation. The danger of unrest fueled by unresolved social and economic problems is always present in what Makhkamov himself describes as the poorest republic in the USSR. He would have been particularly susceptible to the junta's promise to restore order in the country. This promise also appealed to the chairman of the Tajik Supreme Soviet, who told an Izvestia correspondent immediately after the coup that the country was being rescued from chaos.23 By the morning of August 22, Makhkamov had changed his mind about the benefits of the coup and told a group of journalists in Dushanbe that it had been a tragedy that could have precipitated a civil war.24 While he still believed that (LINE MISSING) crisis in the Soviet Union, such measures would have to accord with the law. The following day, the Dushanbe City Party Committee organized a rally in support of Gorbachev as the legally elected president of the USSR at which the leadership of the CPSU was condemned for not having opposed the coup.25 At the same time, Makhkamov decreed the depoliticization of law-enforcement bodies in the republic and his own staff.26 Like his counterpart in Uzbekistan, he seemed to have concluded that the best way to preserve the power of the Tajik Communist Party was to distance it from the discredited CPSU. His efforts may, however, have only limited success in the face of an increasingly vocal opposition. On August 23, the day of the rally organized by the Dushanbe City Party Committee, the Democratic Party of Tajikistan also staged a demonstration.27 This called for the resignation of the republican leadership, the dissolution of the Supreme Soviet, and holding of new elections on a multiparty basis. Instead of a Conclusion It is impossible as yet to foresee the direction that will be taken by the developments set in motion in the Central Asian republics by the coup in Moscow. The Union treaty, to which all Central Asian leaders were committed, has no hope of being signed without major revisions. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan seem to be prepared to join the RSFSR in some sort of union, which could well be joined by the other Central Asian republics. Uzbekistan may vote to declare independence and at the same time opt to join an association of Central Asian republics or the economic union proposed by El'tsin, Nazarbaev, and Akaev. The leaders of all the republics but Kyrgyzstan are trying to salvage as much as possible of their Communist Party structures, which they regard as their only dependable system of administration. The one certainty seems to be that all five republics will emerge from the shattering events of August with far more self-determination than they would have obtained under the Union treaty. ^ 1 Izvestia, August 20, 1991. 2 Telephone report to the Radio Liberty Kazakh service, August 20, 1991. 3 Pravda, August 21, 1991. 4 Komsomol'skaya pravda, August 23, 1991. 5 Komsomol'skaya pravda, August 23, 1991; interview with Akaev, Radio Moscow, August 26, 1991; Izvestia, August 20, 1991. 6 Telephone report to the Radio Liberty Kirgiz service, August 20, 1991. 7 TASS, August 23, 1991. 8 TASS, August 26, 1991. 9 TASS, August 20, 1991. 10 Pravda, August 21, 1991. 11 James Rupert in The Washington Post, August 22, 1991. 12 Central Television, August 26, 1991. 13 Radio Moscow, August 21, 1991. 14 Information telephoned to the Radio Liberty Uzbek service, August 24, 1991. 15 TASS, August 23, 1991. 16 TASS, August 26, 1991. 17 Radio Moscow, August 25, 1991. 18 Central Television, August 27, 1991. 19 TASS, August 19, 1991. 20 Information telephoned to the Radio Liberty Turkmen service, August 22, 1991. 21 Information telephoned to the Radio Liberty Turkmen service, August 23 and 28, 1991. 22 Central Television, August 27, 1991. 23 Izvestia, August 20, 1991. 24 Izvestia, August 22, 1991. 25 TASS, August 24, 1991. 26 Ibid. 27 Ibid.