THE TRANSCAUCASIAN REPUBLICS AND THE COUP Elizabeth Fuller The reactions of the leaders of the three Transcaucasian republics during and after last week's abortive Soviet coup mirror the policy that each has developed over the past year both towards Moscow, as the symbol of the Soviet empire, and towards Gorbachev in particular. In Georgia and Armenia, the seizure of power by the Emergency Committee evoked trepidation and concern at the prospect of military intervention and the thwarting of both republics' aspirations towards secession. Possibly for reasons of caution, neither Georgian President Zviad Gamsakhurdia nor his Armenian counterpart, Levon Ter- Petrossyan, appear to have publicly condemned the coup outright until it became clear that it had failed. Afterwards, however, both men took the opportunity to condemn the actions of the "junta," to argue that both the Soviet Union as a political entity and Gorbachev personally had forfeited all credibility, and to affirm their commitment to achieving full state independence for their respective republics. The reaction of Azerbaijani President Ayaz Mutalibov still remains to be clarified; his alleged support for the coup has triggered a series of mass demonstrations in Baku calling for his ouster and for the republic's independence. Armenia Armenia was unique among the Union republics in its determination to abide strictly by the rules in its campaign to secede from the USSR. To this end, in accordance with the procedures laid down in the USSR Law on Secession, the Armenian parliament voted in March to hold a referendum on September 21 on secession from the USSR. Ter-Petrossyan has said repeatedly in interviews over the past few months that he has little doubt that the Armenian population, embittered and disillusioned by what it perceives as Moscow's blatant favoritism towards Azerbaijan--as exemplified by the collusion between USSR and Azerbaijani MVD troops in systematically deporting the Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh--will express its overwhelming support for independence.1 (This is not to overlook the fact that some circles in Armenia--specifically industrial managers and the Dashnak faction within the Armenian parliament--have expressed reservations, primarily about the possible economic repercussions of divorcing the Armenian economy from that of the USSR.)2 Thus, as one of the six republics that had refused to sign the Union treaty (the others being the three Baltic republics, Moldavia, and Georgia), Armenia was among the regions that stood to lose the most had the coup succeeded. The dangers for Armenia were compounded, moreover, by the implications of the statement issued by the Emergency Committee announcing its intention "to overcome political, interethnic, and civil confrontation"--a formulation that could have been cited to justify further reprisals against the Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh or possibly even the suspension of Armenia's democratically elected parliament and the return to power of the eclipsed Armenian Commmunist Party. On Monday, August 19, the Presidium of the Armenian Supreme Soviet convened to discuss the situation and drew up a statement that was released at a subsequent meeting with representatives of various political parties and of the media. Speaking at the meeting, Ter-Petrossyan stressed that it was "exceptionally important" that all political groupings in the republic, and also the media, "observe the maximum restraint and caution, [and] avoid rash and hasty value judgments." It was, he continued, in the highest interests of the Armenian people to ensure the strict observance of public order and labor discipline and to refrain from meetings and demonstrations.3 The situation in Erevan the following day was characterized as "stable," and Armenian television reportedly complied with Ter-Petrossyan's appeal and refrained from its customary anti-Moscow rhetoric.4 On Thursday, August 22, when the coup was over, Ter-Petrossyan and Armenian Prime Minister Vazgen Manukyan sent a congratulatory telegram to RSFSR President Boris El'tsin, Acting Chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Ruslan Khasbulatov, and RSFSR Prime Minister Ivan Silaev expressing admiration for "the courage of the Russian leadership, whose decisive and infallible actions succeeded in preventing the imposition of an anticonstitutional regime that could have plunged the country into a bloody civil war." The telegram also referred to a statement issued by the Presidium of the Armenian Supreme Soviet declaring the Emergency Committee unstatutory and affirming Armenia's adherence to the principles of democracy and nonviolence.5 (Whether this referred to the statement adopted on the morning of August 19 or to a subsequent document is not clear.) Ter-Petrossyan also revealed on August 22 that, two days previously, the republic's Defense Committee had issued a special instruction making provision for "guerrilla struggle" in Armenia if the situation deteriorated.6 In subsequent statements, Ter-Petrossyan argued that the events of the past week had demonstrated definitively Gorbachev's complete loss of political credibility, and he charged that responsibility for the coup ultimately lay with the Soviet president insofar as it was he who selected and promoted its architects. He conceded, however, that "we too are guilty by virtue of our concessions and compromises to those forces in power at the center."7 (Moscow radio Aug 23) Ter-Petrossyan likewise affirmed that the coup had shown that Armenia had chosen the correct path in deciding to secede: "the time has come for putting an end to calls for staying in the Union, which, as we see now, is a country where a neo-fascist coup is quite possible. We cannot be confident of our future in such a country."8 Several days later, when it became clear that the Soviet Union was on the point of disintegration, Ter-Petrossyan moderated his position somewhat to underscore the virtues of a political union between Armenia and Russia. The Armenian president explained that "we see Russia as a democratic republic --a strong Russia is better for the republics than a strong central government was." He further pledged that Armenia would do what it could to support the Russian leadership and would be willing to allow Russia to keep military bases on its territory. "We have to use this historic chance to create a normal society," he concluded.9 Speaking at the USSR Supreme Soviet session on August 28, Ter-Petrossyan elaborated on his vision of the new Union, arguing that: "We must use this opportunity to preserve our historic unity, but in an entirely different form. I don't mean a federation, I don't even mean a confederation. We have to use this opportunity to create a normal commonwealth along the lines of the European Community."10 Georgia The coup coincided with a government shake-up in Georgia in which the prime minister, one of his deputies, the foreign minister, and the KGB chairman were all replaced. In an emotional television address on August 17, Georgian President Zviad Gamsakhurdia had charged that unnamed enemies were engaging in "sabotage and betrayal" within the country.11 It is therefore understandable that Gamsakhurdia, like Ter-Petrossyan, initially refrained from publicly condemning the organizers of the coup. On August 19, Gamsakhurdia, the Georgian government, and the Presidium of the Supreme Council issued an appeal to the population of the republic to remain calm, stay at their workplaces, and perform their jobs without yielding to provocations or taking unauthorized actions.12 (TASS Aug 19) There are, however, grounds for believing that Gamsakhurdia was ready to comply with at least some of the demands laid down in the decree issued by the Emergency Committee: Interfax reported on August 20 that, following talks between Gamsakhurdia and the head of the Transcaucasus Military District, Colonel General Valerii Patrikeev, Gamsakhurdia had agreed to disarm the Georgian National Guard. On August 20, Gamsakhurdia issued an appeal to the West to support democracy, pluralism, and democratically elected governments in the Soviet Union, and, specifically, to recognize immediately Georgia's state independence (declared on April 9, 1991). On August 21, however, Gamsakhurdia effectively undermined any potential Western support by suggesting in an interview given to CNN that Gorbachev himself had masterminded the coup in an attempt to boost his popularity before the Soviet presidential elections. US President George Bush rejected this hypothesis as "ridiculous". On August 23, after it had become clear that the coup had failed, Gamsakhurdia's press secretary issued a three-page statement rejecting allegations in the media that the Georgian government had not taken a resolute enough stand in condemning the coup. The statement maintained that the appeal of August 19 had called upon the population "to obey the orders of the legitimate Georgian government, which completely excluded the possibility of recognizing the Emergency Committee." The statement further disclosed that the leaderships in Abkhazia and South Ossetia--the two autonomous formations within Georgia that favor signing the new Union treaty--had expressed support for the coup leaders. It also claimed that the Georgian leadership had maintained constant contact with the RSFSR leadership and that Gamsakhurdia had ordered the distribution of El'tsin's decree of August 20 ruling the actions of the Emergency Committee unconstitutional. A second statement issued by Gamsakhurdia's press secretary on August 24 revealed that USSR Defense Minister Dmitrii Yazov had dispatched an army general to Georgia on August 19 "in an attempt to interfere in the internal affairs of our republic" but that the Georgian leadership "did not yield." It is clear, however, that there are elements in Georgia who were seriously disquieted by Gamsakhurdia's seemingly equivocal attitude. Potentially most destabilizing is the action taken by some 15,000 members of the Georgian National Guard under its former leader, Tengiz Kitovani, who had been removed by Gamsakhurdia on August 19. These forces have announced that they are no longer subordinate to Gamsakhurdia and have reportedly distributed leaflets in Tbilisi denouncing the Georgian government for not opposing the coup.13 Azerbaijan Azerbaijan could be characterized as politically the most conservative of the three Transcaucasian republics. In last fall's Supreme Soviet elections the Communist Party won an overwhelming majority of seats (although the Azerbaijani Popular Front has claimed that the results were rigged). Azerbaijan had, moreover, declared its readiness to sign the Union treaty. When the Eemergency Committee seized power during the night of August 18-19, Azerbaijani President Ayaz Mutalibov was in Iran on an official visit. Mutalibov is reported to have stated in an interview given to the Iranian news agency IRNA that he welcomed the coup, which he allegedly characterized as "the natural consequence of the policies that have brought chaos into the Soviet Union over the past few years."14 Mutalibov cut short his visit and returned to Baku on August 19.15 On August 21, TASS issued a statement by the official Azerbaijani news agency Azerinform denying that Mutalibov had expressed "satisfaction" at Gorbachev's removal from power. On August 22, Mutalibov sent a congratulatory telegram to El'tsin.16 The attempt by Azerinform to exonerate Mutalibov failed, however, to convince the Azerbaijani Popular Front. In the August 23 issue of its newspaper, Azadlyg, the front printed what it claims is the text of a statement by Mutalibov in support of the coup that was read over Azerbaijani radio on August 21. All copies of that issue of Azadlyg were confiscated by the republican authorities.17 Moreover, Azerbaijani Interior Ministry troops intervened on August 23 to break up a demonstration convened by the Azerbaijani Popular Front to call for Mutalibov's resignation. Fifty people were injured and several hundred arrested and briefly detained.18 A further meeting on August 26 likewise called for Mutalibov's resignation, the postponement of the presidential elections scheduled for September 8, and Azerbaijan's independence.19 There has been no further clarification of Mutalibov's actions during the period August 19-21. It is, however, entirely plausible that he should have welcomed the advent to power of the Emergency Committee as heralding a far tougher policy by Moscow towards interethnic unrest. (Mutalibov has in recent months been increasingly critical of what he perceives as Gorbachev's unwillingness or inability to neutralize the Armenian guerrillas operating in and around Nagorno-Karabakh.) There are, however, equally compelling reasons why it is in El'tsin's interest to ignore the ambiguity of Mutalibov's response. Azerbaijan produces 60 percent of all machinery and spare parts for the Soviet oil extraction industry, much of which is located in the RSFSR, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan--all republics that have, like Azerbaijan, agreed to sign the Union treaty. If Mutalibov were to be replaced by a candidate from the Azerbaijani Popular Front and Azerbaijan were to declare itself independent, the remaining oil-producing republics of the new Union could find themselves forced to pay for the necessary equipment in hard currency. Tentative Conclusion The events of the past ten days have demonstrated that the Soviet Union has, in Ter-Petrossyan's words "committed suicide." A new agreement governing relations between the RSFSR and the other republics still has to be hammered out. The international community, which showed less than wholehearted enthusiasm in recognizing the independence of the three Baltic republics, is unlikely to risk contributing to further destabilization by extending recognition to Georgia, Moldavia, and Ukraine. While Armenia under Ter-Petrossyan seems willing to forge a new relationship with the RSFSR, Georgia's policy is unclear, and that of Azerbaijan ultimately hinges on the fate of Mutalibov. 1. Sueddeutsche Zeitung, August 24, 1991; Die Welt, August 28, 1991. 2. Avangard, July 9, 1991; TASS, August 17, 1991. 3. TASS, August 19, 1991. 4. TASS, August 20, 1991. 5. TASS, August 22, 1991. 6. Interfax, August 22, 1991. 7. Radio Moscow, August 23, 1991. 8. Interfax, August 22, 1991. 9. The Los Angeles Times, August 27, 1991. 10. The New York Times, August 28, 1991. 11. Reuters, August 18, 1991. 12. TASS, August 19, 1991; Svobodnaya Gruziya, August 21, 1991. 13. Central Television, August 24, 1991. 14. AFP, Reuters, August 19, 1991. 15. AFP, August 19, 1991. 16. Azerinform, TASS, August 22, 1991. 17. AFP, Interfax, Radio Rossii, August 23, 1991. 18. Reuters, August 24, 1991. 19. TASS, August 26, 1991.